






Title: A GUIDED SIMULATION METHODOLOGY 
FOR DYNAMIC PROBABILISTIC RISK 
ASSESSMENT OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS 
  
 YUNWEI HU 
Doctor of Philosophy, 2005 
  
Directed By: Dr. Ali Mosleh 
Reliability Engineering Program 
Department of Mechanical Engineering 
 
Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is a systematic process of examining how 
engineered systems work to ensure safety. With the growth of the size of the dynamic 
systems and the complexity of the interactions between hardware, software, and 
humans, it is extremely difficult to enumerate the risky scenarios by the traditional 
PRA methods. Over the past 15 years, a host of DPRA methods have been proposed 
to serve as supplemental tools to traditional PRA to deal with complex dynamic 
systems. A new dynamic probabilistic risk assessment framework is proposed in this 
dissertation. In this framework a new exploration strategy is employed. The 
engineering knowledge of the system is explicitly used to guide the simulation to 
achieve higher efficiency and accuracy. The engineering knowledge is reflected in the 
“Planner” which is responsible for generating plans as a high level map to guide the 
simulation. A scheduler is responsible for guiding the simulation by controlling the 
  
timing and occurrence of the random events. During the simulation the possible 
random events are proposed to the scheduler at branch points. The scheduler decides 
which events are to be simulated. Scheduler would favor the events with higher 
values. The value of a proposed event depends on the information gain from 
exploring that scenario, and the importance factor of the scenario. The information 
gain is measured by the information entropy, and the importance factor is based on 
the engineering judgment. The simulation results are recorded and grouped for later 
studies. The planner may “learn” from the simulation results, and update the plan to 
guide further simulation.  
SIMPRA is the software package which implements the new methodology. It 
provides the users with a friendly interface and a rich DPRA library to aid in the 
construction of the simulation model. The engineering knowledge can be input into 
the Planner, which would generate a plan automatically. The scheduler would guide 
the simulation according to the plan. The simulation generates many accident event 
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1.  Introduction 
1.1 Statement of Problem 
Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is a systematic process of examining how 
engineered systems work to ensure safety. As the name suggests, this process is 
quantitative. Probabilities of events with potentially adverse consequences are 
calculated, as are the magnitudes of the consequences. Probabilistic risk assessment 
aims at estimating the probability of reaching a particular intermediate condition, or 
an undesirable end state, as well as the manner in which an event or a combination of 
events can cause or increase the chance of a particular undesirable end state being 
reached. The risk of such events is defined as the combination of the event 
probabilities and their consequences. Information on this risk and the failures that 
contribute the most to the risk level are of great value to the public, the regulatory 
agency, and the owner and operators of the system or facility.  
In past three decades, through extensive studies conducted on nuclear weapons, 
nuclear reactors, and other hazardous processes, the PRA methods, particularly those 
for the assessment of the risks of low probability, high consequence accidents have 
evolved to a highly sophisticated level. The well-established PRA techniques 







numerically quantify the risks. The PRA methods typically rely on the risk analyst to 
identify the risk scenarios.  
With the growth of the size of the dynamic systems and the complexity of the 
interactions between hardware, software, and humans, it is extremely difficult to 
enumerate the risky scenarios by the traditional ET/FT methods. Dynamic systems 
can be defined as “systems whose responses to initial perturbations evolve over time 
as system components interact with each other and with the environment.” (Siu 1994) 
Although, almost any real system is dynamic, here we use the word “dynamic” to 
emphasize the importance of timing and interactions. Over the past 15 years, a host of 
DPRA methods have been proposed to serve as supplemental tools to traditional PRA 
in such circumstances.  
Simulation methods are often used to solve the DPRA problems. Due to the high 
reliability of many real systems, such methods are intrinsically rare event simulations. 
It is widely recognized that brutal force Monte Carlo simulation is highly inefficient 
and may result in generating a lot of histories without any information gain (Labeau, 
Smidts, & Swaminathan, 2000 ). A high efficiency simulation engine is often 
essential to treat realistic systems. Many of the techniques introduced in the DPRA 
literature focus on increasing efficiency through preset results and approximations. 
The practical applications to large systems are limited and mostly case-dependent. To 







Acknowledging the problems, the objective of this research is to develop an 
integrated framework for general-purpose dynamic probabilistic risk analysis (DPRA), 
and an efficient model-based simulation engine for risk assessment of complex 
systems of hardware, software, and human elements. 
1.2 Approach 
The approach taken is essentially based on use of simulation models. It provides 
an environment for modeling and risk assessment of complex dynamic systems 
consisting of the software, hardware, and human. In order to efficiently cover the 
enormously large space of possible scenarios, a guided simulation process has been 
formulated that will avoid the slow convergence, which is common in the Monte 
Carlo simulations.  
The dynamic PRA problem is interpreted as an exploration of the space of the 
possible event sequences to gain risk information.  
Simulation methods have been widely used in dynamic PRA. Objective of the 
simulation is to understand the behaviors of the system under a variety of conditions, 
especially those leading to risky scenarios, and to provide insight into those behaviors 
to engineers/analysts. The simulation is probabilistic by its nature. Unlike most of the 
biased Monte Carlo methods in literature, which aim at finding an optimal sampling 







actively employ the engineering knowledge on the system through a plan as a high 
level guide of the simulation. The simulation is then directed according the plan 
toward scenarios which may are more likely to give us insight of the system 
vulnerabilities. The simulation can be interpreted as an exploration of space of 
possible event sequences. The exploration is similar to the exploration of a tree with 
many branches. The value of each branch is evaluated based on the expected 
information gain from that branch, while the information gain is measure by the 
Shannon information entropy. The branches with higher values are more likely to be 
explored.  
To implement and test this methodology the Simulation-based probabilistic risk 
assessment (SIM-PRA), a general-purpose software package is developed. SIMPRA 
is applied to different models to demonstrate its capabilities for performing risk 
analysis on large complex dynamic systems during design and during mission. 
1.3 Major Achievements 
This research has proposed, developed and demonstrated the use of a new dynamic 
PRA framework is proposed. The core method is a new exploration strategy is 
employed. The engineering knowledge of the system is explicitly used to guide the 
simulation to achieve higher efficiency and accuracy. The engineering knowledge is 







map to guide the simulation. A scheduler is developed to guide the simulation by 
controlling the timing and occurrence of the random events. During the simulation the 
possible random events are proposed to the scheduler at branch points. The scheduler 
decides which events are to be simulated. Scheduler would favor events with higher 
values. Value here is measure of how much we want to simulate a specific event. The 
value of a proposed event depends on the information gain from exploring that 
scenario, and the importance of the scenario. The information gain is measured by the 
information entropy, and the importance factor is based on the engineering judgment. 
In another word, the scheduler would favor the events which are expected to provide 
more information, more important by engineering judgment, and brings the system 
closer towards the scenarios of interest. The simulation results are recorded and 
grouped for later studies. The planner may “learn” from the simulation results, and 
update the plan to guide further simulation.  
SIMPRA is the software package which implements the new framework. It 
provides the user with a friendly interface and a rich DPRA library to aid in the 
construction of the simulation model. User can input the engineering knowledge to 
the Planner, and the Planner would generate a plan automatically, according to which 
the simulation would be guided by the Scheduler. The simulation generates many 
accident event sequences and estimates of their end state probabilities.  







small 2-out-of-3 system is analyzed, which demonstrates that simulation results 
converge to the analytical solution very quickly. It shows that the software is capable 
of guiding the simulation to efficiently generate risk scenarios and the probability 
estimates.  
SIMPRA is applied to several larger, more complex systems. A hold-up tank 
example which has been investigated by many authors is reconstructed in SIMPRA. It 
is demonstrated that with guided simulation strategy SIMPRA not only provides an 
estimate of the system end state probabilities efficiently, but also makes it easier for 
the risk analysts to investigate the accident scenarios and find system vulnerabilities.  
A satellite telecommunication system is also studied by SIMPRA when the 
system is still under design. With an abstract model of the system, SIMPRA generates 
possible accident sequences of the system and give a probability estimate the system 
failure and degradation.  
A simulation of Space Shuttle mission in the ascent phase was also constructed in 
SIMPRA. The simulation model is an integrated one of hardware, software and 
human crew. It is very complex and highly interactive. The hardware failure, software 
malfunction and human error all contribute the accident scenarios. 
The research on the new DPRA methodology is a team work. Some of my 
colleagues work on the planner, software modeling and human modeling. My 







scheduler, building the simulation library block, constructing the hardware simulation 
block and integrating the software platform.  
1.4 Outline of this Dissertation 
The outline of this dissertation is as follows. Chapter 2 reviews dynamic PRA 
literature. With a short introduction of the history and recent developments in DPRA, 
a host of DPRA methods are reviewed regarding their advantages and limitations. 
Special attention is paid to discrete dynamic event tree (DDET) and simulation 
methods.  
In Chapter 3, we interpret the DPRA problem as an exploration of the event 
sequences space. The DDET and Monte Carlo simulation introduced in chapter 2 
represent two different exploration strategies: systematic and random exploration. 
Instead of focusing on obtaining a numerical result, we approach the problem of 
exploring the unknown space efficiently. Some of the terminology used throughout 
the dissertation is explained in this chapter.  
In Chapter 4, we propose a new DPRA framework, which employs a new 
exploration strategy. In this framework, the knowledge of the system is explicitly 
used to guide the simulation to achieve higher efficiency. The knowledge is reflected 
in the “Planner” which is responsible for generating plans as a high level map to 







scenarios, which may generate more information about the system.  
The algorithm of scheduler is introduced in Chapter 5. During the simulation, the 
scheduler checks the status of the simulation and guides the simulation toward the 
scenarios of interest. The scheduler is also required to maintain a balance between the 
different scenarios.  
In Chapter 6, we introduce SIM-PRA, the software package which implements 
the guided simulation methodology. It is a generic-purpose risk assessment platform, 
developed in Matlab and Java.  
In Chapter 7, 8 and 9, we apply our methodology to solve the DPRA problems of 
three different models. The first one is the holdup tank problem in Chapter 7, which 
has been discussed frequently in the DPRA literatures. In Chapter 8, SIMPRA is 
applied to a satellite telecommunication system which is still under design. An 
abstract model is built, and accidents sequences and numerical estimation of the end 
state probabilities are generated. Another example is a hypothetical model of a space 
shuttle ascent phase. In the model, we observe complex interactions, between human, 
software, and hardware. The SIM-PRA very efficiently produces a model to depict 
the system and performs the risk analysis. With these two examples, we have shown 







2. Overview of Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
2.1 Brief history background of PRA 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), which is also called Quantitative Risk 
Analysis, has been applied to large complex systems for more than thirty years. The 
first full scale application of PRA methods was the Reactor Safety Study WASH-
1400 (NRC, 1975).  
The PRA methods have also been used in other industry sectors and military. 
After extensive review of NASA safety policy following the Challenger accident in 
1986, NASA instituted a number of programs for quantitative risk analysis. An 
example is the risk assessment of Space Shuttle program (Fragola, 1995). Office of 
Safety and Mission Assurance at NASA headquarters published several handbooks to 
enhance the PRA expertise at NASA (Stamatelatos et al., 2002).  
In some areas, PRA techniques are part the regulatory framework. In situations 
where risk management is critical to mission success, the PRA methods are 
increasingly playing an important support role for management decision making and 
regulatory agencies. 







can be represented as the set of triplets < si, fi, pi >: “scenarios – frequencies – 
consequences”.  
The classical PRA approach involves the construction of separate models 
describing the system vulnerabilities and risks, which is often performed by the risk 
analysts. Models are typically built in the form of fault trees and event trees, which 
are graphical representations of Boolean expressions describing the combinations of 
so-called basic events leading to system failure. Basic events typically represent the 
failure of some components or subsystems. The level of resolution in these models, 
e.g., the extent to which events are decomposed into the contributing basic events, is 
driven by the PRA objectives, as well as the availability of data to quantify the basic 
events(Mosleh & Bier, 1992). The knowledge required to solve the ET/FT is basic 
probability calculation, and commercial software packages are available to construct 
fault trees and conduct the computation.   
2.2 Why DPRA is Necessary 
PRA methodology has been successfully applied in different projects, but it has 
been recognized that it is hard to characterize some complex dynamical systems by 
solely applying such techniques as Event Tree/ Fault Tree analysis. Event trees or 
fault trees are implementations of logic. Primarily, the Boolean logic-based models 







order in which events occur. It is also difficult to model the dependency of the 
probability or rate of occurrence of events on scenarios or time.  
In a Boolean logic based model, even with the “dynamic” expansions, it is the risk 
analysts who identify the interactions between the different parts of the system and 
their influence on the system safety. In a dynamic system such task is far from trivial.  
In the fault tree analysis, an often used unstated assumption is that when the cut 
set occurs, the top event occurs simultaneously. In most cases, this assumption is 
legitimate, but in a dynamic system, especially when there are complex interactions 
between the hardware-software-human, the sojourn time or response time must be 
taken into account explicitly. This is illustrated in (Cojazzi, 1996). 
Apart from the time-dependent analysis, leaving the system dynamics out of the 
picture is considered to be oversimplified in some cases. (Devooght, 1998) The event 
tree analysis can display the correct failure logic of dynamic systems, but due to 
ignoring the role of process variables explicitly, it cannot determine the distribution 
of time to an undesirable state. Event tree is basically a pictorial representation of 
Boolean logic, so the only way event tree can take the process variable into account is 
by discretizing the process variables ranges. When we need detail process variables or 
when the number of variables increases, the event tree may grow unmanageable. 
Without a physical model the event tree analysis has to involve subjective judgment 







achieve the absorbing state may be inaccurate. The stochastic process induced by the 
random hardware/software failures, coupled with the system dynamics and/or human 
intervention would possibly trigger other significant failures in the system.  
Acknowledging such difficulties, a set of new methodologies were developed 
under the name “Dynamic reliability” or “Dynamic PRA”. Because of the diverse 
background of people working on this problem, it is sometimes hard to define the 
term “dynamic reliability”. Nevertheless, it is accepted that the following table lists 
the basic characteristics of dynamic reliability/PRA modeling: (Aldemir & Zio, 1998)  
1. The dynamic phenomena have a strong influence on the system’s 
response (e.g. the operation of control/protection devices upon 
reaching assigned thresholds of the process variables values) 
2. The hardware components failure behavior and on human operator 
actions depends on the process dynamics. 
3. The complex interactions between human operator actions and 
hardware components influence the system’s response and failure 
behavior.  
4. There are a variety of degraded modes related to multiple failure 
modes and the process dynamics.  







dynamic methods are rather supplemental tools. With the DPRA tools, researchers 
would understand clearly the limits of classical approaches, and determine when the 
dynamic methods are needed.  
2.3 Methodologies for DPRA 
2.3.1 Development of DPRA 
The analysis by (Amendola & Reina, 1981) explored the possibility of global 
treatment of the dynamic PRA. Later the DYLAM and ADS implementations were 
applied to treat DPRA problems in nuclear power plants and other areas (Chang, 1999; 
Cojazzi, 1996; Hsueh & Mosleh, 1996; Nivolianitou, Amendola, & Reina, 1986). 
Later, a more general mathematical framework was introduced for probabilistic 
dynamics (Devooght & Smidts, 1992). Probabilistic dynamics theory interprets the 
DPRA problems as problems equivalent to transport problems to be solved , for 
example, by Monte Carlo simulation. Even though the theoretical framework is 
sufficiently general but the complexity of numerical work to solve the equations is 
daunting.  
The wide acceptance of traditional ET/FT methods has led some authors to 
propose extension to include some dynamic features in the FT framework. Others 
have introduced different graphical tools to capture the dynamical features, some of 







and Event Sequence Diagram. A detailed discussion of these techniques can be found 
in Appendix A. For broader overview of the dynamic PRA methodology, there are 
several nice review papers of the DPRA is available (Labeau, Smidts, & 
Swaminathan, 2000; Siu, 1994).  
2.3.2 Theory of Probability Dynamics 
The mathematical formulation of the DPRA problem was first attempted by 
Devooght1992, and later expanded (Devooght & Smidts, 1992, 1996; Izquierdo & 
Labeau, 2004; Izquierdo, Melendez, & Devooght, 1996; Labeau, 1996).  
In this framework the system configuration is indexed by an integer number i=1, 
2, 3…n. This implies that the human software and hardware models are considered to 
be multi-state components. The vector of process variables is denoted as x . The 
evolution of the process vector in state i is deterministic and defined by a set of 
differential equation: 
 ( ) ( ) Ni xxxxfdt
xd
ℜ∈== ,0, 0  (1) 
The deterministic evolution may be interrupted by a random walk form one state to 
another. The probability of that ( )ix,  will change to ( )jx,  per unit time 
is ( )xjip |→ , and the solution to equation (1) with initial condition 0x is ( )0, xtg  







which denoted the likelihood of find system at point x and in state i at time t. The 











In a Markovian framework, the Chapman-Kolmogorov equations give, 
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Written in the integral formulation: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
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The integral formulations allow for a semi-Markov extension (Devooght & Smidts, 
1996) and a unified treatment of transitions on demand and transitions in time.  
Izquierdo  et al. extend this theory to account for “stimulus” which may trigger 
automatic or manual actions (Izquierdo & Labeau, 2004). They call it stimulus-driven 
theory of probabilistic dynamics (SDTPD). The state space includes additional 
extension: stimulus activation states are considered. A stimulus is either an order for 
action from human or automatic control device, or the fulfillment of conditions that 







The closed form of analytical solutions has been attempted several times. Some 
small systems with Markov assumption were solved (Cukier, 1991; Labeau, 1995; 
Labeau et al., 2000). ESDs can provide semi-analytical solutions while reducing the 
dimensionality of the problem by solving a sequence of integrals rather than a large 
system of PDEs (Swaminathan & Smidts, 1999). For larger systems, the analytical 
solution is hard to find. Discretization methods, such as Discrete Dynamic Event 
Tree, or simulation based methods present great potential to solve the DPRA 
problem. 
2.3.3 Graphical Models 
Graphs provide an intuitive representation of the system logic. To take advantage 
of the fact the risk analysts are familiar with classical Event Tress/ Fault Tree 
analysis, extended types of Fault Tree formalism have been proposed to address the 
dynamic evolution of systems. Other graphical frameworks dealing with dynamic 
systems which have been applied successfully in various engineering fields are 
introduced into reliability/ risk analysis. Examples are Petri Nets, (Chatelet, Chabot, 
& Dutuit, 1998; Dutuit, Chatelet, Signoret, & Thomas, 1997; Malhotra & Trivedi, 
1995; Tombuyses, 1999; Vernez, Buchs, & Pierrehumbert, 2003; Volovoi, 2004), 
Dynamic Flowgraph Methodology (DFM), (Houtermans, Apostolakis, Brombacher, 







2004; Matsuoka & Kobayashi, 1988)and Dynamic Event Sequence 
Diagram(Swaminathan & Smidts, 1999, 1999, 1999). 
The graphical representation often serves as an input scheme of a numerical or 
mathematical procedure, e.g., Markov chain, which will be solved to obtain the 
numerical estimate of the system. Sometimes the graphs can encode Markov or semi-
Markov processes. Petri Nets and GO-FLOW are examples which are modification of 
state graph to account for the accident specific features. ESDs which emerged from 
traditional PRA methods are also shown to be able to encode a Markov or semi-
Markov process.  
All these techniques enhance the ability to deal with dynamic reliability/PRA 
problem, but they also have their limitations. One common drawback of these 
approaches is that due to exponential explosion of the state space, the graphs rapidly 
grow unmanageable. Another limitation is that some graphical schemes rely on the 
Markovian assumption, which may not hold in most real systems, and the Markovian 
approximation may generate a distorted estimate.  
This research would not follow this line of thought. One aim of this research is to 
ease the burden of risk analysts to identify all possible risk scenarios, which is exactly 
what is required by the graphical models. The intuitiveness of the graphical 
representation is still appealing. In fact, graphical models are supplementary tools in 







of the state transition diagrams. The graphical models used here, however, would not 
be directly used to generate the underlying probabilistic model which would be 
solved analytically or numerically.  
2.3.4 Discrete Dynamic Event Tree: 
Discrete Dynamic Event Trees (DDETs) are simulation methods implemented by 
forward branching event trees, the branch points are restricted at discrete times only. 
The knowledge of the physical system under study is contained in a numerical 
simulation, written by the analyst. The components of the system are modeled in 
terms of discrete states. All possible branches of the system evolution are tracked 
systematically (Cojazzi, 1996; Hsueh & Mosleh, 1996; Nivolianitou et al., 1986). One 
restriction of DDET is that the events (branches) only happen at predefined discrete 
time intervals. It is assumed that if the appropriate time step is chosen, DDETs would 
investigate all possible scenarios. It is a straightforward extension of the classical 
event trees. The binary logic restriction of classical event trees is removed. The 
construction of the tree is computerized. An example of DDET is given in Error! 
Reference source not found. 
The systematic branching would easily lead to such a huge number of sequences 
that the management of the output Event Tree becomes awkward. Measures have 







length of the time step, but this may be at the expense of the accuracy of the analysis. 
A cut-off probability Plim was introduced in some implementations. The branches 
with a probability lower than Plim would be discarded. (Amendola, 1988) suggested 
that when the number of failures in a sequence exceeds a user-defined value, further 
evolution along this sequence would be stopped. The determination of such 
parameters is problem-dependent.  
 
Figure 2.3.1 A Discrete Dynamic Event Tree 
Implementations of DDETs include DYLAM,(Cacciabue, Carpignano, & 
Vivalda, 1992; Cacciabue & Cojazzi, 1994; Cojazzi, 1996; Nivolianitou et al., 1986) 







2.3.5 Monte Carlo Simulation 
While DDETs require the events to occur at predefined discrete time only, the 
Monte Carlo simulation approaches allow events to happen at any time. This avoids 
the combinational explosion of DDETs. Monte Carlo methods is insensitive the 
complexity and dimension of the system. Any modeling assumption could be 
included, the non-fixed failure rate assumption, random delays, interaction between 
components and process dynamics, etc. Dubi claimed that MC is the only practical 
approach to solve the realistic systems (Dubi, 1998). Generally the MC methods 
estimate the system safety or reliability directly, expressed in form of a probabilistic 
distribution function ( )tix ,,π . 
The analog between Monte Carlo simulation for PRA and the transport problem is 
often drawn, (Devooght & Smidts, 1992; Dubi, 1998; Smidts & Devooght, 1992). In 
the Monte Carlo simulation framework, a system is defined as a collection of 
components and state of the system is described by at least one real valued “system 
functions” as the function of its state vector and possibly other relevant parameters. 
The system function is defined on phase space (B; t), where state vector of the system 
is defined as: B = (b1; b2; b3; . . . ; bn), and bi is the state of component i. The phase 
space vector (B; t) indicates that the system entered the state vector B at time t. The 







and time. The behavior of systems is governed by an underlying transport equation. 
The system transport kernel is the product of the free flight kernel and the 
collision kernel: ( ) ( ) ( )BBtCttBTtBtBK →×→=→ ';';',',' . 
The free flight kernel ( )ttBT →';' is defined as the probability density that a system 
which entered state B’ at time t’ will have a next event at time t > t’. The collision 
kernel, which is also called event kernel, ( )BBtC →';  is defined as the probability 
that upon an event at t in state B ′  the system will change its state into B . 
Let { }B ′  be the set all state vector B ′  from which it is possible to transfer to B  in 
a single event. The event density 
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If we recall that for a system with n components, each of which has ki different 




. If the order of events is 




! different situations. The state explosion 
makes the analytical solution of the transport equation prohibitively difficult. The 
Monte Carlo simulation is almost only feasible solution.  
We note that here, the state vector is defined as finite set of discrete states of the 







extension to account for continuous-time process variables can be found in many 
literatures. (Labeau & Zio, 1998; Smidts & Devooght, 1992; Tombuyses, DeLuca, & 
Smidts, 1998)  
2.3.6 Discrete Event Simulation 
Discrete Event Simulation is based on concept the concepts of state, events, 
activities and processes (Carson, 2004). In strict definition of discrete event 
simulation, the model state changes only at discrete times. Events represent the 
instantaneous change of system state. When an event occurs, it may trigger new 
events, activities and processes. Between events, the system is considered to be 
deterministic. A process is a sequence of events, activities and other time delays 
associated with one entity as it flows through a system.  
Extension to treat continuous process variables is needed in most risk analysis 
problems (Dang, 1998). It is considered the evolution between events is deterministic. 
Like the Monte Carlo approach, this is implicit state-transition methodology, where 
there is no need to enumerate the possible system states, and the possible transition 
rates.  
According to Siu, discrete event simulation has higher ability to deal with 








2.3.7 Improvements to Simulation Methods 
Despite all its advantages, the Monte Carlo and discrete event simulation methods 
display some drawbacks when applied to DPRA problems. When applied to dynamic 
PRA, due to the high reliability of most systems, the required number of simulation 
runs may become extremely large and impractical. Much research work has been 
conducted on using biased sampling for rare event simulation. In rare event 
simulation, great care must be taken to address the completeness of the search of 
scenarios. Another drawback is that the simulation results are hard to analyze. 
Various attempts have been made to tackle these problems. There are two classes of 
methods to improve the simulation efficiency. One class aims at improving the 
sampling efficiency, with the help of advanced biasing techniques. Thus we can get 
statistically better result with fewer runs of simulations. The other class attempts to 
accelerate the simulation speed, which will reduce the time consumption of the single 
run the simulation.  
1. Biasing Techniques 
a. Importance Sampling 
Importance sampling is a standard variance reduction technique of Monte Carlo 
simulation. Consider the situation where we attempt to estimate: 














l . This estimator is 
sometimes referred to as crude Monte Carlo estimator.  
Let ( )yG  be a cumulative distribution function such that ( ) ( ) ydygydG = , and 
( )yg  is a PDF for ny ℜ∈ . The density function ( )yg  is called the importance 
sampling biasing distribution. Rewrite the target function: 











xfxLxdxfxLXL gl  








where ( ) ( ) ( )xgxfxW = . Here we can see that ( )yg  should never be zero for any 
value of x, if p(x) is positive. Mathematically, it implies that the support of g(.) must 
include the support of f(.). However, there would only be a problem where L(x) is 
nonzero and the ratio of f(.) and g(.) is infinity, thus the requirement is: 
( ) ( )LgportLfport ⋅⊂⋅ supsup  
The likelihood ratio W(x) can be interpreted as a “correction factor” or “statistical 
weight” necessitated by the change of measure from f to g. To minimize the variance 













It has been shown that the minimizing g is given by: ( ) ( ) ( )
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If L(x)>0, then ( ) ( ) ( )
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The main difficulty of finding the optimal importance sampling is that knowledge 
of g* implies knowledge of ( ){ }XLΕ=l , which is precisely the quantity we wish to 
estimate. The fact that the analytical expression for the sample performance L is 
unknown in most simulation may worsen the situation. The construction of g* is 
complicated and time-consuming, especially when g* is a high-dimensional pdf.   
The biasing techniques introduced later in this chapter can be viewed as 
implementation of the importance sampling techniques. Only a few of biasing 
techniques are reviewed here. More general discussion of variance reduction 
techniques and rare event simulation can be found in (Bucklew, 2004; Rubinstein & 
Melamed, 1998) 
b. System-based vs. Component-based.  
Labeau et al. (Labeau & Zio, 2002) compared the indirect Monte Carlo method 
and direct MC methods. The system-based, indirect MC is derived from the transport 
analogy we discussed above. First the next transition time for the whole system is 







configurations can be analyzed and compared to a cut set. The component based, 
direct Monte Carlo method samples the next transition time of every component, and 
the earliest transition is chosen as the actual one.  
Theoretically, if the individual components properties are known, the probability 
distribution function of the next system transition can be deduced. The sampling from 
such PDF is complex, especially when the system size grows larger, and the 
exponential assumption for the individual components is lifted. In such cases, the CB 
approach is more straightforward and allows for time dependencies and component 
interactions. A special case where the component failure time pdfs are analytical 
invertible is investigated, and the component based sampling turns out to be more 
efficient.  
c. Biasing Toward Top event 
Marseguerra et al. have discussed the Monte Carlo methods to estimate the 
reliability and availability of a complex system (Marseguerra & Zio, 1993). It is 
recognized that in the analog Monte Carlo many simulated histories do not yield 
much information. In order to improve the computational efficiency, they introduced 
a new biasing technique, which aims at driving the system toward a cut set 
configuration, which is more interesting but highly improbable. The concept of 







sets was introduced to get a variance reduction technique. All possible transitions of 
the system were classified according whether the transition would bring the system 
closer or farther to the top-event (cut-sets). By doing this, the biasing techniques 
favor not the failures, but the transitions which lead toward top event of the fault tree.  
d. Exponential biasing vs. Uniform biasing  
In (Marseguerra, Zio, & Cadini, 2002) the Biased Monte Carlo simulation of 
time-dependent failure is discussed. It is shown that if biased sampling from 
exponential failure rate may result in a distorted estimate if the sampling failure rate 
is too high, on the other hand, if the sampling failure rate is too low, the result may 
have large variance. Sampling from a uniform distribution can get a better 
distribution throughout the mission time. They found that the sampling from a 
discrete uniform distribution generates “extremely satisfactory” results. The 
conclusion was drawn based on case studies of small-size problems. Whether the 
conclusion still holds with larger systems needs further investigations.  
2. Accelerating the Numerical Simulation  
The computation of system dynamics is time-consuming. Simplified dynamics is 
alternative to detailed numerical calculation. Trained artificial neural networks 
provide a fast approximation of the system dynamics. Artificial Neural Networks is 







reduction in computing time. However, the fact that there is no general way of 
training an artificial neural network limits the application of this method. (Chatelet, 
Zio, & Pasquet, 1998; Marseguerra, Masini, Zio, & Cojazzi, 2003; Marseguerra, Zio, 
Devooght, & Labeau, 1998)  
Another way is the memorization-based methods. This approach starts with 
memorizing the system trajectories prior to simulation. This is achieved either by 
computing a grid of disretized process variable space (Marseguerra & Zio, 1995), or 
just memorizing the faultless trajectory. (Labeau & Zio, 1998)  
2.4 Summary 
The Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (DPRA) methodology has been evolving 
in the last two decades. DPRA methodologies are capable of handling interactions 
between components and the process variables, they provide more realistic modeling 
of the dynamic systems for the purpose of risk analysis. There is a growing 
recognition in the risk community of the potentials of these methods. Discrete 
Dynamic Event Tree and Monte Carlo simulation are two classes of methods that 
have been widely used. In next section we will focus on these two classes of methods, 








3. DPRA as Exploration of Event Sequence Space 
3.1 Introduction 
A primary goal of DPRA is to identify vulnerabilities of the system, which is 
achieved by simulating a variety of sequences of events that are representative of all 
possible behaviors of the real system. The event sequences typically share a single 
initial condition, but are varied by introducing possible deviations. Such deviations, 
which may happen at various times, may be caused by hardware and software 
failures, as well as human actions. The set of simulated sequences is then analyzed to 
gain insight into events leading to undesirable end states, and their likelihood. 
In the problem setting, we assume we understand the rules (e.g. physical laws) 
governing the system evolution, so that we can build a simulation model which 
represents the behavior of the system under different circumstances. Due to the large 
scale of realistic large systems and the complexity of their internal and external 
interactions in the systems, we cannot predict the system evolution for sure, even 
when we are equipped with a good understanding of all the underlying laws. The 
simulation model, which includes hardware, human crew and software, is a 







models are used to simulate the behavior of a system and physical processes taking 
place within the system, as a function of time. The stochastic elements are typically 
used to represent such events as the random failure of hardware systems and 
instruments, as well as the uncertain actions of human operators.  
The occurrence and timing of the random events are controlled by the simulation 
program. In between the points of occurrence of these random events, the behavior of 
the system is modeled by deterministic models describing the physical and other 
processes taking place in the system.  
Typical “stopping conditions”, i.e. absorbing states, for a sequence are mission 
time or the attainment of some condition in the system. Based on the stopping 
condition, the sequence of events can be classified as belonging to one of a set of 
predefined end states, representing the type and severity of the outcome of the 
particular event sequence. These end states are determined by the simulation model 
based on the process variables and/or the component states. When the sequence is 
completed, the analysis will continue by the simulation of another sequence. 
The manner in which the event sequences to be simulated depends on the type of 
DPRA method. The Discrete Dynamic Event Tree methods e.g. (Cojazzi, 1996; 
Hsueh & Mosleh, 1996; Nivolianitou et al., 1986) systematically explore a large 
number of scenarios by introducing, at set points in time, branch points whose 







events. The event sequences are usually explored using a depth first or breath first 
approach, and the analysis terminates when all the event sequences are exhausted. 
Error! Reference source not found. illustrates the structure of DDET. 
In another class of methods, the Continuous Dynamic Event Tree (CDET) 
methodology (Devooght & Smidts, 1992; Smidts, 1994), event sequences are 
randomly explored in the space of all possible event sequences. The exact manner in 
which sequences are generated varies. The analysis is terminated after a 
predetermined number of scenarios, or when some statistical objective is met.  
The CDET class of methods is typically used to obtain estimates of system failure 
probabilities. Given that many of the stochastic elements in the system model 
represent rare events, the applicability of these methods depends heavily on the use of 
variance reduction techniques such as “importance sampling” (Campioni, Scardovelli, 
& Vestrucci, 2005; Dubi & Gerstl, 1980; Labeau & Zio, 2001; Labeau & Zio, 2002; 
Marseguerra & Zio, 1996; Marseguerra et al., 2002; Tombuyses et al., 1998).  
The discussion of importance sampling techniques can be found in 2.3.7. In 
principle, the quality of importance sampling depends heavily on the understanding 
the problem. The zero variance is achieved when we understand the problem 
perfectly. In literature the biasing techniques used for DPRA focus on simply 
accelerating the failure at component level. One of the few, if not only, exceptions is 







3.2 Characterization of the Dynamic PRA Process 
The previous section described dynamic PRA as the analysis of risks and 
vulnerabilities by means of the simulation of many event sequences. The event 
sequences are generated by controlling the occurrence, and timing of stochastic 
elements in the model, such as hardware failure and human actions. In between the 
points of occurrence of these random events, the behavior of the system is typically 
modeled by the deterministic models. This description of the process applies to 
Dynamic PRA frameworks such as (Acosta & Siu, 1993; Cojazzi, 1996; Devooght & 
Smidts, 1992; Hsueh & Mosleh, 1996). 
In this section, we present a characterization of Dynamic PRA that was developed 
in order to support the development of DPRA algorithms. 
3.2.1 Basic Terminology 
We first consider some of the basic terminologies that will be used throughout the 
discussion in this dissertation.  
Model: an abstraction of the real-life system. Models are used to obtain 
predictions of the behavior of real system, especially how one or more changes in 
various aspects of the modeled system would affect the other aspects of the system.  







System Configuration: It is assumed that all the components in system have only 
finite number of states. The system configuration, which is determined by the 
component states, can be indexed by a positive integer NC = . 
System Status: System status includes both continuous process variables, (a real 
number vector X  ) and discrete system configuration (a positive integer i). It is 
defined on NS n ×ℜ=   
The process variables are governed by a set of deterministic equations 
 ( ) ( ) Ni xxxxfdt
xd
ℜ∈== ,0, 0 . These equations are implied by the model. The explicit 
expression of the equations may not be available for all aspects of the system 
behavior.  
Event: following the convention of discrete event simulation, an event is defined 
as an instantaneous occurrence that changes the system configuration (Carson, 2004). 
There are two kinds of events. The event is defined as transition of system 
configuration from state i to state j at time t. CC →:intδ  
• Random Events are the events whose occurrences are depicted by a 
stochastic model and can be controlled by the simulation environment. 
Such events are not necessarily induced by the behavioral rules of the 







component failure modeled by the Weibull model.  
• Deterministic Events are induced by the deterministic rules. An example 
of deterministic events is that a threshold pressure or temperature is 
reached. 
Event Sequence: a system trajectory, generated by the simulation model. It 
consists of a sequence of events, with deterministic behavior in between. Every event 
sequence should be unique. It is an instance of the system status evolution through 
time line. TES ×= intδ  
Event Sequence Space: the set of all possible event sequences. The definition of 
the event sequence space is implicit, i.e. follows from the definition of the simulation 
model. Event sequences in an event sequence space are considered to be mutually 
exclusive, even though they may partially overlap, since they are assumed to originate 
from a single initial state of the system. }{ iESSP =  
Sequence Generation: the process of simulating one or more event sequences, 
equivalent to the, possibly random, drawing of realizations of event sequence from 
the event sequence space. 
Scheduling: the process of controlling the generation of event sequences. It is 
done by deciding on the occurrence and timing of the random events in the model. 







a random event is considered by the algorithm controlling the simulation. Each 
branch point will have two or more branches, corresponding to occurrence of possible 
events.  
Scenario: a simplified representation of a group of event sequences with some 
common features. These features concern the (non-)occurrence, and possibly the 
timing, of events. The sequences belonging to a scenario are therefore considered to 
be similar, to the extent that they share the features implied by the scenario.  
End State: a classification of the condition of the system at the end of an event 
sequence. It is an absorbing state of the simulation. Within the context of (D)PRA, 
end states are normally specified as one of the discrete end state types, which 
typically indicate the severity of the condition. 








Figure 3.2.1 Illustration of DPRA Terminology 
3.2.2 Event Sequences vs. Scenarios 
As part of our characterization of DPRA processes, a distinction is introduced 
between event sequences and scenarios. An event sequence has been defined as a 
system trajectory, possible within the behavioral rules of the executable simulation 
model, consisting of a unique sequence of random events, with deterministic behavior 
in between.  
The term scenario is referred to as a group of event sequences with some common 
features. These common features concern the (non-)occurrence, and possibly the 







therefore considered to be similar, to the extent that they share the features implied by 
the definition of that scenario.  
The difference between an event sequence and a scenario is therefore that the 
scenario is not fully specific about the occurrence, timing, or time ordering of events 
taking place during the event sequences, which allows for the grouping of the 
sequences, as well as a simplification of their representation. In case a scenario is 
defined solely based on the combination of event occurrence, ignoring all timing, 
Boolean expressions can be used to describe it.  
A last simplification of event sequence descriptions, as implemented by scenarios, 
is the grouping of events that are considered equivalent. Particularly when redundant 
system elements are considered, it may be sufficient to know that one of the 
redundant systems encountered an event, e.g., a failure, whereas the particular system 
that encountered the event is irrelevant. Leaving out the unnecessary details leads to a 
simplification of the description. 
Descriptions of scenarios involving the timing of events can be achieved using, 
for instance, temporal logic (Shults & Kuipers., 1997). These types of expressions 
allow combinations, or the sequences, of events to be described with their temporal 
order and charateristics. These logics provide a formal basis for scenario specification. 
Based on these logics, set operations can be defined over the space of event 







Note that dynamic PRA approaches do not always implement a clear separation 
between event sequences and scenarios. For instance, Discrete Dynamic Event Trees, 
mentioned in a previous section, consist of a collection of event sequences that are 
represented in the form of a tree structure, reflecting the systematic fashion in which 
the event sequences were generated. However, the event sequences are implicitly 
taken as being representative of groups of event sequences. This is evidenced by the 
fact that finite probabilities are assigned to the event sequences, even though the 
probability of occurrence of individual event sequences is infinitely small. The 
probability of a scenario, i.e. the combined probability of groups of event sequences, 
can however assume finite values. 
The removal of details regarding the occurrence and/or timing of events from 
analysis is a common practice in the classical Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
approach. First, the fault tree and event tree models used to represent the system 
failure logic generally do not represent time. Second, cut-set analysis can be 
interpreted as a way of finding the least specific description of combinations of events 
that are expected to result in the failure or an end state of the system.  
A distinction is however that in classical PRA applications, cut-sets are 
specifically associated with a failure of the system. In contrast, no direct association 
is assumed between scenarios and a particular end state. Scenarios are not necessarily 







Therefore, the end states of the event sequences belonging to a given scenario may 
well be different. 
As we will see, the uncertainty about the end states of sequences belonging to a 
scenario will play an important role in the specification of rules for the exploration of 
the event sequence space. The term ‘outcome’ will therefore be used to distinguish 
between the end state of an event sequence, and the variation of end states of 
sequences belonging to a scenario. 
Table 3-1 Comparison of Event Sequences and Scenarios 
 Event Sequence Scenario 
Detail of Representation Complete detail Less specific 
‘Consequence’ Uniquely defined end state Possibly uncertain outcome 
Probability Not Defined Defined 
3.3 Exploration of the Event Sequence Space 
As defined in a previous section, an event sequence space is the set of all possible 
event sequences. Each sequence then represents a unique combination of timing and 
occurrence of the events. This way it is possible to conceive of many, if not an 
infinite number of, event sequences originating from a single starting condition. 







sequence space.  
The process of generating event sequences by simulation can be viewed as an 
exploration of the event sequence space. The objective is to identify how the 
sequences lead to an undesirable end state, as well as an estimate of the probability 










Figure 3.3.1 An event sequence in the probabilistic event sequence space.   
At the start of the exploration, we know the behavioral rules of the physical 
processes, the software logic, and the operators that make up the system, as well as 
the starting system condition from which the simulation of sequences is initiated 
(boundary conditions and initial conditions). The actual specification of sequences 
then takes place by varying the occurrence and timing of the random events in the 







environment that is referred to as the scheduler, consistent with the terminology used 
in the ADS and DYLAM DPRA environments (Hsueh & Mosleh, 1996).  
The exploration/scheduling algorithm, which is separated from the numerical 
simulation model, decides how the event sequences are generated, generally by 
controlling the occurrence of the random events in the model.  
Simply taking all combinations of all possible events may not give the correct 
extent of event sequence space, as the event sequence space is constrained by the 
behavioral rules of the physical processes, the software logic, and the operators’ 
actions. These constraints determine if and when certain events, or combinations of 
events, can take place.  
A combinatorial approach towards the scheduling of the simulation, analogue to 
the combinatorial design of experiments (Mason, Gunst, & Hess, 2003), is therefore 
not directly possible, as many combinations of events are rendered impossible by the 
rules that model the actual behavior of the system, and the possibility of particular 
combinations of events can not be anticipated in advance in many cases. 
Instead, current DPRA frameworks largely rely on two strategies that will be 
referred to as systematic and random exploration. 
3.3.1 Systematic Exploration 







DYLAM. The systematic approach operates by considering, at discrete points during 
the simulation, which events could possibly happen at that point in time, and to 
systematically explore, i.e., simulate, each of those options. The result of this 
strategy, which is typically implemented using a depth-first traversal of the event 
sequences, is a tree structure corresponding to the repeated branching of the event 
sequences, which is referred to as the Discrete Dynamic Event Tree (DDET). 
While this approach has the advantage that shared sections of the event sequences 
only need to be simulated once, it is computationally demanding since the repeated 
branching of sequences leads to a combinatorial explosion of the number of 
sequences. Stopping the exploration before it is complete, after the generation of a 
predetermined number of sequences, or predetermined amount of computation time, 
would leave part of the sequence space untouched by the exploration.  
The combinatorial explosion is typically counteracted by limiting the number of 
time points at which branching of the sequences can occur, as well as by stopping the 
simulation of sequences as soon as their likelihood of occurrence falls below a preset 
threshold value. It is known that these control measures introduce a bias in the risk 
estimates, i.e. sequence probabilities. (Smidts & Devooght, 1992).  
The discretization of the event sequence space may affect the credibility of the 
results in other ways as well. By discretizing the event sequence space, single event 







example, a sequence involving the occurrence of an event at a predetermined point in 
time is taken as representative of any sequence involving the occurrence of the event 
sometime during an interval. While this does lead to a reduction of the computational 
load by allowing reuse of simulated segments, it affects the ability to identify 
vulnerabilities of the system, since it does not allow the sensitivity to small changes 
in the sequences, such as the timing of events, to be identified. This while, depending 
on the type of system, the end state of an event sequence may be highly sensitive to 
the particulars of the sequence, an analogy to one of the basic concepts behind Chaos 
Theory. The discretization of the sequence space makes it hard to detect such 
sensitivities. 
In the implementation of systematic explorations (DYLAM, DETAM, ADS), the 
discrete time points at which the branching may take place is predefined, and in many 
cases, by fixed time step. There is always a trade off between precision and 
computation cost when setting the time points. Too many branching time points 
would not only increase the computational cost but also make the resulting DDET too 
large to manage. Situation may grow more difficult, if the simulated mission time is 
long. In the cases where automatic control and safety devices are ubiquitous and in 








3.3.2 Random Exploration 
Random Exploration is an alternative strategy and is less sensitive to 
combinatorial explosion. It does not involve the discretization of the event sequence 
space. This type of exploration consists of Monte Carlo experiments in which event 
sequences are randomly generated by randomly deciding on the occurrence and 










































Figure 3.3.3 Illustration of Random Exploration 
Events are allowed to take place at any time and not just at predetermined points 
as is the case in systematic search. The exploration can in principle be stopped after 
any numbers of generated sequences, even though a higher number of sequences will 
generally improve the statistical quality of the results, e.g. reduce the variance in 
probability estimates.   
DPRA approaches based on a random exploration strategy (Dubi, 1998; Labeau, 
1996; Smidts & Devooght, 1992) typically apply variance reduction techniques such 
as importance sampling (Campioni et al., 2005; Labeau & Zio, 2001; Labeau, 1998; 
Labeau & Zio, 2002; Marseguerra & Zio, 2000; Marseguerra et al., 2002). These 







on the understanding that component-level failures will typically bring the system 
itself closer to a failure. As long as system-level failures of a system can indeed be 
interpreted as a combination of component-level failures, and component-level 
failures are by nature a rare occurrence, the acceleration of component-level failures 
will result in an increase in the number of sequences ending in system failure. This in 
turn may help improve the system failure probability estimates.  
It is recognized that the biasing techniques have to be designed with great care. 
(Marseguerra et al., 2002) showed that poorly designed biasing technique may lead to 
distorted estimate. If the system has several competing failure modes, and /or the 
system is non-coherent, the biasing toward component failure strategy should be 
designed with even greater care. Marseguerra et al. attempted to take the fault tree 
into account (Marseguerra & Zio, 1993). Instead of simple favoring component 
failure, they tried to favor the events leading to a cut-set of the fault tree.  
The random exploration approach is less equipped however to support another 
objective of the DPRA process, namely the identification of vulnerabilities in the 
system that could bring the system to an undesirable state. In a random exploration 
sequences are generated largely independent of each other: each time a new sequence 
is generated, it is done without consideration of sequences that have already been 
generated. Consequently, the sequences can not easily be organized in a structure like 







The storage of details on the nature of the generated sequences is therefore not 
practical, and generally does not take place. This makes it hard to perform such tasks 








4. Enhanced DPRA Framework 
4.1 Problem Statement 
As discussed in chapter 3, DPRA problem can be interpreted as exploration of the 
space of event sequences to discover the system vulnerabilities and provide an 
estimate of the likelihood, if possible. In the realistic high reliability system, risk 
scenarios are rare, and the exploration scheme may spend a lot of time in the areas 
which do not give the risk analysts much insight into what may lead to undesirable 
conditions. The exploration strategy should be able to avoid such areas where provide 
little information (efficiency). The effort should also be distributed fairly between all 
risk scenarios (fairness). Spending most of the effort in one scenario and leaving 
other scenarios unexplored or explored only few times is undesirable. At the same 
time, we want the exploration to be able to cover all possible scenarios 
(completeness). No scenario should be left unexplored. The event sequences space is 
infinitively large in most cases.  The practical objective is then to explore all 







4.2 Adaptive Exploration 
4.2.1 Traditional Exploration Strategy 
The DPRA methods which we have discussed so far largely rely on mechanistic 
procedures such as systematic exploration and Monte Carlo experiments, where 
exploration are controlled according to preset rules. Little or no effort has been made 
to take into account the impact of events, or of combinations of events, in the context 
of the system’s behavior.  
It is acknowledged that not all parts of the event sequences space have the same 
importance from risk perspective. It is natural that we want to guide our simulation 
toward the parts which represent higher priority. DDET does not take this into 
account. Most biased Monte Carlo simulation tried this on a component level, based 
on the belief that the component failures would more likely lead to risk scenarios. The 
knowledge of the system, which is obtained by traditional PRA and reliability 
analysis, is seldom taken into account. One of the few exceptions is in (Marseguerra 
& Zio, 1993) where Marseguerra et al tried to drive the system towards the more 
interesting but highly improbable cut set configurations.  
An active understanding of the meaning of observed behaviors and significance of 
control actions, as well as a dynamic adjustment of exploration strategies is a 








4.2.2 Bayesian Adaptive Exploration 
Human brain behaves in an adaptive and self-adjusting way. We learn from 
experience incrementally, make decisions and adjust questions through the learning 
process. In the DPRA settings, what has been learned from past data could be used to 
alter the exploration strategy of future to more efficiently address the questions of 
interest. A general framework of adaptive learning procedure is depicted in Figure 
4.2.1.  
 
Figure 4.2.1 Adaptive Learning 
The theories of experimental design have recognized that the use of partial 
knowledge can improve the design of experiments (Chaloner & Verinelli, 1995). The 
Bayesian experimental design is motivated by Bayesian decision theory and the fact 
that there is always information available prior to the experiment. The optimal design 
is made under uncertainty by enumerating the possible actions, and the possible 







information as utility, while the information is quantified using information 
theory(Shannon, 1948).  A utility U(o,a) is assigned to action a if the outcome turns 
out to be o. The available information, I, implies the probability of observing 
outcome o, p(o|I), then the expected utility associated with action a is 
















1| . The optimal action is the one that maximizes the expected utility. A 
more formal way to express the framework can be found in (Chaloner & Verinelli, 
1995; Lindley, 1972).  
Inspired by the achievement of the Bayesian experimental design, and Bayesian 
adaptive exploration (Loredo, 2003), we believe similar procedure would help us in 
developing a new exploration strategy.  Examples of such application are: 
• The use of prior knowledge or expectations regarding the system’s 
capabilities and behavior, and the source of such knowledge includes 
design documentations, such as requirements and specifications.  
• The use of knowledge gained during the testing/ simulation itself, i.e., the 
results of test cases already performed, based on which the priorities 
during the remainder of the exploration can be dynamically adjusted.  







types of functions or operations that are more likely to introduce system 
failures.  
These types of knowledge are therefore applied to actively and continuously 
decide on the priorities of running different types of test cases, to a large extent based 
on a sense of the extent of knowledge that can be gained by each of those test cases.  
It is believed that the efficiency of DPRA procedures can be improved through 
the application of methods and techniques that duplicate or resemble this prioritizing 
behavior. The efficiency improvement would be achieved by making the exploration 
of the space of possible sequences more directed, and increasing the chance that the 
simulation of an event sequence is useful and provides insight into the behavior of the 
system.  
4.3 Outline of a New DPRA Methodology 
4.3.1 The Framework  
Based on the view of DPRA simulations as an exploration process, it is believed 
that the DPRA can benefit from the incorporation of enhanced rules for the 
scheduling of sequence simulations. Here, scheduling is defined as the process of 








The new framework will replace the brute-force random and systematic 
exploration approaches with dynamic exploration rules modeled after the rules 
applied by an adaptive scheduler. 
The enhancement would largely invoke two types of knowledge. First, the 
scheduling of sequences should take into account prior knowledge about the behavior 
of the system, which may include both system-specific information, such as the 
design of the system, as well as generally applicable information about the system or 
its elements. The experience of similar systems, near-miss incidents previously 
observed, common vulnerabilities of similar systems, are examples of this type of 
knowledge. Traditional Event Tree/ Fault Tree analysis normally try to capture such 
prior knowledge. Due to their highly abstract nature, ET/FT analysis is often 
inadequate to model complex dynamic behavior of the system. However such models 
and knowledge they embody could still serve as a guide of the simulation.  
The simulation model includes some of the rules which dictate the system 
evolution. Such rules may be initially abstract, and it is possible to refine the model to 
represent a better understanding of the rules later. We shall bear in mind that the level 
of abstraction can evolve in time, when we obtain a better understanding the system, 
or at a later stage of the system development. Correspondingly, we should be able to 
have a more detailed model. The scheduling rules should also take this into account.  







sequences during the simulation. The results obtained from the simulated sequences 
should be applied to, adaptively, modify the focus of the exploration. In Figure4.3.1, 
the inclusion of the new sources of information is indicated by the highlighted arrows.  
 
Figure4.3.1 Proposed enhanced usage of the information in the DPRA exploration. 
Therefore the new framework emphasizes the capability of the simulation to be 








4.3.2 Key Elements 
The internal structure of the new framework consists of: 
• A planner that generates a plan which is an interpretation of the 
knowledge of the system as an initial list of scenarios of interest. The plan 
serves as a map for exploration.  
• A “scheduler” that manages the exploration process, including saving the 
system states, and restarting the simulation. The scheduler will guide the 
simulation toward the plan generated by planner.  
• A simulation model of the system.  
• Output analysis, which analyzes the event sequences generated by the 
simulation, and may update the plan if needed.  
The knowledge of the system vulnerabilities can be expressed as a list of 
scenarios which may lead to undesirable end states. Recalling the definition of 
scenario, the scenario does not have to be complete event sequences. There is no 
requirement that the list of scenarios would cover all the event sequence space. In 
event tree analysis, the complete event sequences need to be laid out by the analyst, 
and it is essential to accurately cover all the event sequence space with the event 
trees. Fulfillment of this requirement of event tree relies on the expertise of the risk 







do not have much relevant experience.  
 
Figure 4.3.2 Framework of the New Model Based DPRA Platform 
By contrast, in the proposed DPRA framework, the scenarios listed in the plan 
serve as a “guide” for the simulation. Due to the randomness of the simulation, it is 
believed that with a large number of guided simulation stories, all event sequences of 
interest would be touched. The “guide” is usually expected to be incomplete, even 
incorrect, information on which part of the event sequences has a higher priority to be 
explored.  
The random elements of the simulation would be controlled by the scheduler. The 
objective of scheduler is to distribute the simulation effort among different scenarios. 







other scenarios also have a chance to be simulated. Among the “important” scenarios, 
we want the scheduler to guide the simulation efforts evenly. Simulation focused on 
only one or few scenarios, leaving other important scenarios untouched, is 
undesirable.  
Among the desired properties the scenario exploration should: 
• Maintain sufficient coverage of important scenarios 
• Guide simulation toward areas of greatest uncertainty 
• Continuously adjust priorities based on simulated results  
• Avoid test areas known to definitely lead to a specific end state. 
• Simulation should be able to cover all the event sequence space. 
 
4.4 Implementation of the Planner of DPRA Simulations 
If we think of the DPRA as an exploration of event sequence space, the plan is the 
map to guide the exploration. In the map, the interesting scenarios are highlighted, 
and we want our simulation to explore such scenarios more often. We want to explore 
the whole map, and it is undesirable to miss any of the scenarios. As we are exploring 
the event sequence space, we may find out that the map is inaccurate in some place, 







update the map, and updating the map is one of the objectives of the exploration.  
The plan is a list of scenarios toward which the risk analysts want to guide the 
simulation. Planner collects useful knowledge about the contributors to different 
classes of risk scenarios and generates the plan for the simulation. Planner gives 
guidance to the scheduler on how to reach the end-states of interest. It also receives 
some information from the simulator to update its knowledge.  Finite State Machine 
(FSM), and Qualitative Differential Equations among other techniques have been 
used to generate the plans. The state transition diagram, if it is available, provides 
very useful information to generate a plan. The regular FSM presentation is extended 
so that the uncertain states and state transitions can be modeled as well. As stated 
earlier, the scenarios generated in the plan do not have to be accurate or complete. 
The simulation would update the knowledge of system, and in turn, may result in an 
updated plan, which is more accurate and more complete.  
The planning methodology is being developed in a companion research effort, 
details of which are provided in (Mosleh et al., 2005).  
4.5 Implementation of the Scheduler of DPRA Simulations 
Aided by the plan the scheduler is responsible for guiding the simulation toward 
the more interesting scenarios. The scheduler will load the plan from the plan file, and 







guiding the simulation adaptively.  
The simulation would propose the transitions (branches) to the scheduler 
whenever it comes to a branching point. The scheduler then retrieves the information 
of the proposed transitions, and decides which branch to explore. The exploration 
command is sent back to the simulation, and the simulation model would execute the 
command, and continue the simulation, until another branching point or end state is 
reached.  
The scheduler aims at maintaining a fair distribution among the interesting 
scenarios, and at the same time, the scheduling is still random, and any transitions are 
possible, thus ensure that no scenarios would be ruled out. The details of the 
scheduler algorithm are in chapter 5.  
The term “Scheduler” has been used in the implementations of DDET 
methodology, such as DYLAM (Cojazzi, 1996) and ADS (Hsueh & Mosleh, 1996), 
but the role of the scheduler is quite different in our framework. In DDET 
implementations the scheduler directs the simulation to perform the systematic 
traversal of all the possible branches, typically in a depth-first manner, and the 
scheduler does not make decisions of choosing branches. In our new framework, the 
scheduler not only is capable of performing the depth-first search as in the DDET, but 
also adaptively guides the simulation toward the scenarios of interest. The latter part 







4.6 Interactions Between Planner and Scheduler 
4.6.1 Load Plan into Scheduler 
At the beginning of each simulation, the scheduler will load the plan from the 
plan file generated by the planner. The plan file is text file, while list the scenarios 
line by line.  
It is recognized before the simulation the knowledge of the system may be vague, 
abstract, incomplete and even inaccurate. The purpose of the simulation is to enrich 
the information of the system. Therefore, we cannot anticipate that the plan generated 
by the planner would be complete, detailed, or accurate. 
The planer works with an abstract model of the system. The level of abstraction is 
usually not the same as the simulation model, as typically the plan captures 
knowledge at a higher (more abstract) level. For example, the scenarios generated in 
plan may include “engine failure”. In the simulation model, the engine is a complex 
sub-system, and there is no single event “engine failure”. The “engine failure” would 
be translated to one or more event sequences based on, for example, the fault tree 
type of model of the engine failure. The detailed scenarios are used by the scheduler 
to guide the simulation. The simulation model itself may be updated. We may get a 
more accurate and more detailed model of the component, and as a result, the event 







ease the burden of the planner. The plan generated from an abstract model does not 
have to be changed. Instead, we update the knowledge base of event sequences 
corresponding to each abstract scenario at different stage of modeling.  
A database is maintained by the risk analysts to interpret the abstract scenarios 
generated by planner. When the scheduler loads the plan, if there are such abstract 
scenarios, the scheduler will query the database to get the detailed scenarios, and 
generate a detailed plan, which can be used to direct the simulation.  
4.6.2 Update Plan Based on Simulation Result 
As we have seen in Figure 4.3.2, the plan will be updated from time to time. 
There are several types of updating. The first type is automatic updating after 
simulating a specific number of event sequences. The planner will check the 
simulation results so far to determine how well the simulation is following the plan. If 
some scenarios have been underrepresented, the planner would automatically set the 
importance level of the specific scenarios to a higher level, which would in turn make 
the scenarios more favorable by the scheduler. The purpose of this adjustment is to 
maintain a exploration fairly distributed among different scenarios. This step may 
happen more than once in the simulation.  
A second type of updating needs analysts’ intervention. The result of simulation 







The discrepancy is highlighted for further investigations.  
Several different things may contribute to the discrepancy. It may be that the 
simulation model somewhat misrepresent the reality which make some scenarios 
impossible in the simulation. Or it may be that the plan is inaccurate, and needs to be 
modified. This is referred to as spurious scenarios in qualitative simulations (Berleant 
& Kuipers, 1997; Kuipers., 1986; Shults & Kuipers., 1997). A typical source of this 
situation is that some scenarios (paths) which appears in the state graphs are rendered 
impossible by the constraint of the physical reality. The qualitative reasoning part of 
the scheduler tries to identify such scenarios, and eliminate them from the plan. There 
is no guarantee that all spurious scenarios would be identified and eliminated (Say & 
Akin, 2003). Once there are such scenarios in the plan, no matter how hard the 
scheduler tried, no event sequences could be generated in these scenarios, since the 
simulation model is a representation of the physical reality. The output analysis may 
find such scenarios, and refine the plan accordingly.  
Another reason could be an ill-designed sampling procedure. If the sampling 
distribution is heavily skewed, some scenario may never be sampled. In our 
implantation, we carefully design the sampling method to make sure that all the 
possible events have a chance to be sampled. The discussion of sampling is referred 
to branch point generating in our approach.   















5. Scheduler Algorithms 
This section describes the methodology and algorithms of the scheduling of 
simulations. The objective is to develop the ability to adaptively schedule the 
simulation of sequences such that the simulation effort is guided toward scenarios of 
interest and is “fairly” distributed among the possible scenarios. 
5.1 Problem Definition 
We use the simulation to gain the knowledge of the evolution of the state of the 
system over time. There are several random elements in the system, which we cannot 
predict with 100% certainty. One kind of random events is that we cannot know for 
sure what will happen at a specific time. For example, the backup system may fail to 
start when there is a demand. We refer to this kind of random events as “demand-
based” in this dissertation. The random events also can be time-distributed. They can 
occur within some time interval, but we do not know when. Sometimes the behavior 
of such events is characterized by their rate, or probability, of occurrence, which may 
be dependent on time as well as the state of the system. The occurrence of random 







The occurrence of random events is controlled from outside the simulation model. 
The responsible mechanism, referred to as the scheduler, guides the exploration of the 
sequence space by controlling the occurrence of individual random events according 
to some exploration strategy. The specification and implementation of the exploration 
strategy is the topic of this chapter. 
Suppose that we have a list of interesting scenarios, which we want to investigate 
in detail. The objective of this study is to devise and implement a strategy for the 
exploration of the event sequence space that allows us to adaptively schedule the 
simulation of sequences such that the simulation is guided toward these scenarios and 
the effort is fairly distributed among them. 
The scenarios are represented in the form of a tree structure. In the simplest case, 
these expressions specify the combination of single events, but more complex logic 
structures are also considered. The scenarios are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
The solution to the scheduling problem can be subdivided into two problems. 
First, the solution to the problem requires us to develop the ability to control the 
occurrence of individual events in such a manner that simulated sequences belong to 
a particular scenario. However, the repeated simulation of a single sequence 
belonging to the scenario of interest does not help in the assessment of the outcome of 
a scenario. The solution should therefore be able to ‘sample’ sequences randomly 







Secondly, a “fairness” criterion must be formalized, and a corresponding rule for 
prioritization of the scenarios must be devised. The requirement that the scheduling 
takes place in an adaptive manner means that the fairness criterion should consider 
the results from sequences that have already been simulated. The scheduling 
mechanism should thus routinely revise its scheduling priorities based on the latest 
state of information. 
5.2 Scheduler Overview 
The scheduler is the procedure and software controlling the execution of a 
simulation model, and more specifically, deciding on the occurrence of non-
deterministic events in the simulation model. The scheduler would accept a plan, 
which consists of a set of scenarios. Each scenario consists of an abstraction of a 
group of event sequences. Sequences are defined as specific realization of the 
simulated timelines. The objective of the scheduler is to generate sequences according 








Figure 5.2.1 The Scheduler Framework 







initialization, the first branching points conditions is calculated, and passed to the 
simulation model. Then the continuous-time (deterministic) simulation starts 
calculating the system trajectory based on the initial conditions. Once any one of the 
branching point conditions is reached, the simulation generates a branch point, which 
means that there are at least two branches possible. Each branch represents a possible 
stochastic event, for example, the occurrence and non-occurrence of a hardware 
failure. Another example is the human operator action, when there is a stimulus for 
the operator to take action, the operator may have several possible responses, each of 
which is represented as a branch. Branches are proposed events to the scheduler. The 
scheduler will check the current status of simulation, the plan, and previous 
simulation results. Based on the exploration rules, the scheduler will decide which 
branch to explore, and sends back the decision to simulation model. At the same time, 
the system state, criteria for next branching point and/ or the deterministic simulation 
model are all updated. This process is called “executing transition”. The simulation 
resumes, until it reaches next branching point or absorbing (end) state.  
5.3 Representation of the Plan in Scheduler 
The Event Sequence Space is represented by a tree structure. Each branch of the 
tree, which consists of a sequence of nodes, represents a scenario, which is a class of 







the system to behave. We may be more interested in some branches than others, based 
what we have learned from previous experiences.  
Each node represents a statement, of such types as 
• Required event or events; 
• Negation of some event or events; 
• Events with time condition, e.g. happened in a specified time interval; 
• Combination of several events.  
The tree represents how the scenarios partially overlap. For instance, if two 
scenarios both define event A as a required event, the node specifying this will be 
shared by both scenarios. 
The system evolution is depicted by the moving from one node to another. In 
order to keep track of the current state of the simulation, each node has a “status” 
variable, which is defined with respect to a single sequence, i.e., the status is reset at 
the start of every sequence. The status is used to track the progress of the simulation 
within the plan. So when the simulation reaches a certain stage in the plan that some 
certain nodes are ready to be explored, such nodes are marked as ‘arrived at’. At that 
time, when an event (or a combination of events) occurs that fulfills the requirement 
set by the node, the status of the node becomes ‘occurred’, and the immediate 







some nodes are no longer possible to explored, they are marked as “negated”. In this 
way, the scheduler is able to track the simulation in the plan. 
To illustrate how this scheme works, let us look at the following example. Figure 
5.3.1 demonstrates how the status of each node is changed during the progress. Each 
node is designated by a number. The nodes may have sub-nodes. The tree on the left 
side illustrates the current state of system evolution: 
1. Node 1 is marked as “occurred”,  
2. The other branches which are inconsistent with the current system state are 
“negated”; like node 2 and all the sub-nodes of node 2. By “inconsistent” we mean 
that those nodes can no longer be satisfied given current system state.  
3. The immediate sub-node of node 1 is “arrived” 
4. The nodes of the deeper levels are “not occurred”.   
Note that we assume that nodes 1_1, 1_2, and 1_3 are associated with the event a, 
b, and c, respectively, which means, for example, if “event a” happens at this stage 
then the node 1_1 occurs.  
Then, we assume that “event a” happens. The new system state is described in the 
tree on the right side of Figure 5.3.1. The occurrence of “event a” makes the node 1_1 
status change to “occurred”. Consequently, the children nodes of 1_1 are “arrived”. 







illustration we see how the system moved one step forward. 
 
Figure 5.3.1 System Evolution 
5.4 Branch Point Generation for Stochastic Events 
We consider the rules for the generation of stochastic event sequence branch 
points in this section. The rules for branch point generation could be either 







5.4.1 Probability-based Branch Point Generation 
This rule can be applied to events that occur with an intensity function h(t,x), 
which may or may not be a function of time and the current state of the system.  
The rule is applicable both to systematic search and random search event 
sequence space exploration schemes. In case of a systematic search, the simulation 
scheduler will, at each branch point, explore both branches corresponding to 
occurrence and non-occurrence of the event. In case of random exploration, the 
scheduler will (randomly) select one of the branches. 
The rule divides up each simulated scenario in a number of subsequent time 
intervals, and generates one branch point in each of those intervals. The time intervals 
are chosen in such a way that, assuming that the event has not yet occurred, the 
conditional probability that the event takes place in a given interval is equal to ΔP. In 
mathematical terms,  
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where t’k-1 and t’k are the bounds of the k-th time interval, t is the time of occurrence 
of the event, and 
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according to the system’s time-to-occurrence distribution. Let u be a sample from the 
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which corresponds to the probability of occurrence of the event between t’k-1 and tk. 
The following is the algorithm that implements this rule. Let H(t) denote the 
cumulative intensity at time t 
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Then the time tk at which the k-th branch point is generated is given by 
 1( ) ( ' ) ln(1 )k kH t H t u P−= − − ⋅Δ  
where 
 ( ' ) ln(1 )kH t k P= − ⋅ − Δ  
The last of these equations illustrates the fact that the choice of a constant 
conditional probability interval translates into a constant increment of the cumulative 



















Figure 5.4.1 illustrates the construction of the intervals for ΔP = 0.1 and h(t) = 
0.01. Since the intensity function h(t) is constant, the intervals are of equal width. 
 
Figure 5.4.1: Construction of intervals. 
The sampling of the branch point is illustrated in Figure 5.4.2. The horizontal axis 
shows the cumulative intensity function; the vertical axis represents the conditional 
probability of occurrence of the event. The example sample point u ΔP is converted 
into a value of the cumulative intensity at which the branch point should be 
generated. Note that for small values of ΔP, this conversion is approximately linear. 
Figure 5.4.3 shows an example of generated branch point times, randomly chosen 













Figure 5.4.2 Conversion from u ΔP to H(tk). 
10.5 21.1 31.6 42.1  
Figure 5.4.3 Example of generated branch point times within each interval 
For certain time-to-occurrence distributions, such as exponential and Weibull, the 
value of tk can be determined as a function of H(tk). In other cases, for instance when 
the intensity of occurrence depends on the physical conditions in the system, tk may 
have to be determined through integration of h(t,x). In this case, the boundary points 
t’i will depend on the particulars of the scenario being simulation.  
In general, when the intensity function is not constant, branch points will be 
spaced more densely when h(t,x), or simply h(t), assumes higher values. 
5.4.2 Time-based branch generation 







The time condition of the event is specified by the user/ modeler. The mission is 
divided into several critical time intervals, during which the event may happen. The 









Figure 5.4.4  Illustration of the branching points 
The branching time point tbr is uniformly distributed in the time interval (tll, tul) 
( ) llllulbr tttt +−⋅= α , where α is a uniform random number in (0,1). 
This branching generation scheme is useful when there are specific time intervals 
which are very critical to the mission, but are very short. Short in a sense that 
generating a branch point in that interval using probability based scheme is almost 
impossible.  
5.4.3 Branching Point Generation for Demand Based Event 
The stochastic behavior of a component may be described by the probability 







probabilistic branching stochastic process has a set of outcomes, each with of a 
probability of occurrence. The timing of the occurrence is not random; instead, the 
outcomes at that point of time are random. The failures of standby components or 
components starting on demand are examples of this class of stochastic behavior. 
Human actions may be considered this way as well if we ignore the delay in human 
reactions.  
When system simulates this kind of behavior, possible outcomes are proposed to 
the scheduler. It is not limited by binary branches. When there are more than two 
possible outcomes, all possible outcomes are considered and proposed. The scheduler 
treats the proposed events in the same manner as the time-to-failure events. The 
branches generated represent different possible scenarios. There is no difference to 
scheduler whether the branch is generated by time-to-failure events or probabilistic 
branching events.  
5.5 Scheduling Algorithm Based on Value 
At a branch point, all the branches are proposed to scheduler. The value of a 
branch is defined as the measure of how much we want to simulate that particular 
branch. The scheduler will decide which branch to explore based on the values of all 
possible branches. The value of each branch is evaluated based on several factors. 







5.5.1 Entropy as Measure of Information 
One motivation for simulating the event sequences is to gain information, i.e., to 
reduce the uncertainty about the end state of similar sequences also belonging to that 
scenario. 
If event sequences belonging to a particular scenario consistently result in a single 
end state, the motivation to spend more simulation time on the simulation of that 
scenario should decrease, as the expected added value of those simulations decreases. 
This applies regardless of whether the consistently encountered end state is a 
desirable or undesirable end state. We see, therefore, that we should favor the 
simulation of scenarios with a variable rather than a consistent outcome. 
A second contribution to the uncertainty is the lack of knowledge about the 
scenario’s outcome and an understanding of the system behavior, as well as an 
experience in the form of the observation of event sequences. Lacking either form of 
knowledge about the scenario, its outcome is going to be inherently uncertain, 
regardless of whether the system would behave in a consistent fashion were it 
observed. 
Figure 5.5.1 illustrates possible states of uncertainty about the outcome of a scenario. 
For illustration purposes, we assume that event sequences end up in one of two end 
states, even though the presence of more than two end state types is assumed in the 







probability p that a sequence belonging to the scenario results in the first of the end 
states. The vertical axis in each chart represents the likelihood, or belief, of p being 
the number. A Beta distribution with α=1, β=1 is a uniform distribution in (0,1). This 
is non informative, which means the likelihood of the p being any number in (0,1) is 
the same. The Beta distribution with α=26, β=26, yields a belief which the likelihood 
of the p being 0.5 is much higher than any other number. The Beta distribution with 
α=1, β= 51 represents a belief that p being close to 1.  
 
Figure 5.5.1 States of uncertainty about the outcome of a scenario. 
The uncertainty or rather the amount of information, represented by such 
distributions can be measured using Shannon’s entropy measure (Lindley, 1956; 
Shannon, 1948). Given a probability distribution over the measure, the negative 
differential entropy measure is used, defined as 
 ( ( )) ( ) ln ( )I dπ θ π θ π θ θ= ⋅ ⋅∫  







statistical sense, the maximum information is obtained when the probability 
distribution is concentrated on a single value, i.e. a δ function. The information is 
reduced when the PDF spreads. When Shannon introduced entropy, it is in the 
communication engineering, which is the opposite case faced by us.  
We now apply this entropy to measure the state of information about the outcome 
of an event sequence belonging to a particular scenario S. We note that we will be 
considering the uncertainty about the end state of a simulated sequence, i.e., the 
probability distribution over the end states given that a sequence belonging to the 
scenario is simulated, rather than a probability distribution based on the natural 
frequencies of the event. 
We initially consider that each sequence s in S ends in one of two end states. Let x 
be our degree of belief that end state E will be reached, and let our belief regarding 
this probability be described by a Beta distribution 








=   
where 1α −  and 1β −  respectively represent the number of times that end states 1 
and 2 are observed in a total of 2α β+ −  sequences. Then the entropy measure is 
equal to 







where, ( )zψ  is the digamma function, 
 




ψ Γ= Γ =
Γ
 










= − +∑   




1 1 1( ) ( )
m m mm m m
α β α βα
α
ψ α ψ α β
+ − + −−
= = =
− + = − = −∑ ∑ ∑   
For large values of z, the digamma function can be approximated efficiently by 
( ) ( ) 2ln zzz −≈ψ . 
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which applies when more than two end states are possible for each sequence, the 
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Figure 5.5.2 illustrates the information values for the Beta distribution. The figure 
illustrates that for the uniform distribution (Be(θ|1,1)), the negative entropy is 0, 
representing a state of ignorance about the outcome of the scenario. The plot shows 
that as more sequences are simulated, the level of information about the outcome 
generally increases, and should in fact be expected to increase.  
The negative entropy increases the fast along the axes of the surface plot. This 
indicates that the level of information about the outcome of an experiment increases 
fast when the outcome is consistent. However, an inconsistent outcome after a series 
of experiments with a consistent outcome can significantly reduce the information 
measure, representing a loss of confidence and increase of uncertainty, which can 
reasonably be expected in case of a surprise outcome. A surprise, or an outcome 








Figure 5.5.2 Information measure as a function of Beta distribution 
5.5.2 Expected Entropy Gain Through Experiment 
To calculate the value of a branch, we need to know the expected information we 
expect to gain if we follow that specific branch. Since we use entropy as the measure 
of uncertainty, it is natural to measure the expected information using entropy. The 
exploration of a branch can be viewed as a stochastic experiment, which has a limited 
number of possible outcomes.  
Shannon introduced the idea that information is a statistical concept and proposed 







ideas to measure the information in an experiment rather than in a message (Lindley, 
1956). The amount of information provide by experiment is measured by comparing 
the knowledge before and after the experiment, while the measure of information is 
given by Shannon’s entropy. The knowledge gained by an experiment can be 
described by a Bayesian inference model. The knowledge before the experiment is 
expressed by a prior distribution ( )θπ 0 , where  θ  is the parameter we are interested 
in, and Θ∈θ . The experiment results in an observation x. Then, the knowledge after 
the experiment is ( )x|θπ , according to the Bayes theorem: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )θπθθπθπ 00 || xpx ⋅= ; where ( )θ|xp  is the likelihood function.  
The amount of information before the experiment, with respect to θ  is 
( ) ( )[ ] θθπθπ∫ ⋅= dI 000 log  
If we introduce the expectation operator θE , which denotes the expectation with 
respect to θ , the equation is rewritten as: 
( )[ ][ ]θπθ 00 logEI = .  
We note that the minus sign introduced by Shannon is not used here. In a 
statistical sense, the maximum information is obtained when the probability 
distribution is concentrated on a single value, i.e. a δ function. The information is 







engineering, which is the opposite case faced by us. The objective of communication 
is to transmit a message, x, which is received as message, y. The concentration on 
single value would allow no choice in his message, thus, no information transmitted. 
Therefore, the scales in these two cases are reversed.   
After an experiment is performed and the value x observed, the amount of 
information is  
( ) ( )[ ] θθπθπ∫ ⋅= dxxI |log|1  
While the prior knowledge ( )θπ 0 , the amount of information provided by the 
experiment ε, when the observation is x, is defined as: 
( )( ) 010 ,, IIxI −=θπε , 
Further, the average amount of information provide by the experiment ε, is 
defined as: 
( )( ) ( )[ ]010, IxIEI x −=θπε  
In the exploration problem here, the branch is corresponding to the experiment ε 
has n possible outcomes. We have the PDF of the outcomes 0π , either from the prior 
knowledge, if we are at the start of the simulation, or the updated PDF with previous 
simulation results. The equation above still applies here. 







to a special case. We are performing an experiment of examining the probability p of 
getting a head from tossing a coin. The experiment has only two possible outcomes, 
head or tail {H, T}. Before the experiment we have no information of the probability, 
so our prior is a beta distribution between (0,1) ( ) [ ]1,0;10 ∈= ppπ . The likelihood of 
getting result {n heads and m tails} is  

























The posterior distribution would be ( ) ( ) ( )











ππ .  








We recognize that this is a beta distribution with 1,1 +=+= mn βα . The entropy 
of Beta distribution is showed in Figure 5.5.2.  In a more general case, if our prior 










= , where 
( )βα ,B  is the Beta function. The posterior when we get result {E=n heads and m 














, which is the Beta distribution with 
1,1 00 ++=++= mn ββαα . 







our prior knowledge expressed as a beta distribution with 00 , ββαα == . The result 







=HL . The posterior distribution when result is a head is  














Similarly, the posterior estimation when result is a tail is  













The expected information gain is calculated based on the prior and posterior:  
 ( )( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )pITpILHpILIxIEpI ppTpHx 0010 ||, ππππε −⋅+⋅=−=  
Figure 5.5.3 is plot of the expected information for )50,1();50,1( 00 ∈∈ βα  (Note that 
on that plot, the information gain is on log scale.) 
From figure 5.5.3 we can see that the information gain at the beginning of the 
experiment is high, and the information gain is decreasing. It is easy to understand 
that when there is little prior information, few or even one experiment result can gain 
us significant understanding, but when there are sufficient data already, single 









Figure 5.5.3 Expected Information Gain for Experiment with a Beta Prior 
We list four representative cases in Table 5-1. The first row shows the prior 
information represented by a Beta distribution. The second row is the expected 
information of a single experiment starting from such prior information. The case of 
(1,1) represents non-informative prior, no experiments have been performed yet. It is 
expected that one single experiment could gain much information. In other cases with 
priors (6,6), (10,2) and (11,1), the prior information represents the information gain 
after ten experiments, where the results are  {5 heads and 5 tails}, { 9 heads, 1 tails} 
and { 10 heads and no tails} respectively. We can see that (6,6) represent great 
uncertainty, and the information gain from this case is much higher than (11,1) where 







Table 5-1 Expected Information Gain of Beta Prior 
Prior α, β (1,1) (6,6) (10,2) (11,1) 
Expected Info 0.19 0.04 0.038 0.035 
The case of multiple end states is studied in Table 5-2 Expected Information Gain. 
A non-informative prior is assumed. The posterior PDF is a Dirichlet distribution (see 
section 5.5.1). From the table we can find a clear pattern that the expected 
information gain decreases with number of sequences, and outcome consistency. The 
conclusion is an extension of the binary experiment case.  
Table 5-2 Expected Information Gain for A Dirichlet Distribution 
Previously Observed Outcomes, by end states 




0 0 0 0 0.3030 
0 0 0 4 0.1578 
0 0 2 2 0.1626 
2 2 0 0 0.1626 
1 1 1 1 0.1684 
0 0 0 9 0.0974 
0 2 3 4 0.1050 








5.5.3 Principle of Evaluating the Value of Exploring a Scenario 
As designed earlier value of each scenario serves as a measure of how much we 
want to simulate that specific scenario. The scheduler works by comparing the value 
of all possible branches. The higher the value, the more likely the scheduler will favor 
the branch. To generate the algorithm of evaluation, we summarize a set of principles: 
• Value of a specific scenario should be consistent with how much 
information is expected to be gained by simulating/exploring that 
scenario.  
• Value of a specific scenario should be consistent with the importance 
level based on prior information or engineering experience. 
• One scenario with high value will make the value of  whole group of 
scenarios high. A bunch of branches with low values, does not necessarily 
add up. 
• Value should be coherent with how close it brings the system towards 
ending. 
The expected information gain is one of the most important factors in the value of 
a scenario. Apart from the expected information gain, previous experience with same 
or similar systems is likely to give us a hint that some scenarios are more important 







explore the event space. This type of information would be provided as the 
“importance level” in the plan. The scenarios we are interested in may still have sub-
branches, so to evaluate the value we will have to take account of all the sub-
branches. If one of sub-branches has a high value, it will considerably increase our 
interest in that branch. But if all the sub-branches have very low values, they do not 
simply add up to a high value, i.e, increased interest in that specific branch.  
5.5.4 Algorithm for Evaluating the Value of Proposed Event 
The value of a proposed event is a function of the expected information gain, 
impact factor and importance factor. The information gain evaluation algorithm 
has been discussed in section 5.5.3. Importance factor is an engineering judgment of 
how much we want to explore or avoid the scenarios. It is subjective and relies on the 
expertise of the engineers and risk analysts. The importance of a scenario is 
considered a function of 
 Learning value: ability to provide new insights 
 Engineering criticality: significance from engineering perspective  
The engineering criticality is a measure of the perception by engineers/analysts 
that particular scenarios are (not) of interest. It an event is expected to lead to severe 
end states, the importance level would be high. Other knowledge involved in the 







have been observed in similar systems. The risk analyst would assign an importance 
level to each scenario in the plan.  
The impact factor is an object measure of how close the transition would bring the 
system towards an end state. It is a real number valued between 0 and 1. The 
algorithm of calculating the impact factor is designed in the scheduler.  
The value of each event proposed at the branch point is evaluated by evaluating 
the value of any of the scenarios that are enabled by the proposed event. A value is 
assigned to each scenario originates from the branch point. The evaluation follows the 
steps: 
i. The value of a proposed transition event depends on the value of the scenario 
which it enables, and the evaluation of the scenario has been discussed in 
5.5.3 
ii.  Multiply the raw value from step ii measure with the importance factor. 
iii. We multiply the raw value deduced from step iii with the impact factor which 
is based on whether the transition associate with the branch takes the system 
closer to an end-state or not.  
 If the event satisfies a node, which moves the system forward, the impact 
factor is 1;  







scenarios, the factor is 0;  
 If the event partially satisfies a node, the factor is between 0 and 1.  
5.5.5 Exploration of Branches 
Whenever a branching point is reached, the further exploration options are 
proposed to the scheduler by the simulation model. The scheduler will decide which 
branch to explore, and send the exploration command back to the simulation model. 
The simulation model would execute the command.  
In the scheduler, each option is like a branch. The scheduler will  
i. Retrieve the information of each option; and 
ii. Evaluate the value of each branch, as discussed in 5.5.4 and 
iii. Choose the option using a Russian Roulette style algorithm, and 
iv. Send the exploration command back to scheduler.  
The scheduler will decide which branch to explore according to the value. The 
higher value implies higher likelihood of the scenario being simulated. If the 
scheduler simply choose the branch with highest value, it is likely that the simulation 
would be locked in the scenarios listed in the plan. As we have stated earlier, the plan 
is only a rough guide, and is not intended to be complete, or accurate. We do not want 
the simulation to be locked in the scenarios in the plan. The scheduler should be 







simulated. According to the algorithm, the probability of exploring a specific branch 
is proportional to the value of that branch. This is similar to Russian Roulette 
algorithm in (Marseguerra & Zio, 1993).  
When there are n proposed branches, and the value of each branch is Vi’, the 






iV , and the interval (0,1) is 
divided into n subinterval accordingly. A uniform random number u is drawn from 
(0,1) to determine the branch chosen, that is ith branch is chosen, if u fall into ith 
subinterval. The process is illustrated in Figure 5.5.4. 
 
Figure 5.5.4 Choosing Branch Based on Value 
 
5.6 Event Sequence Quantification 
The scheduler works in such a way as to explore the scenario we are interested in 







human errors, and software failures to happen more frequently, or in some cases, less 
frequently compared to their natural frequencies or probabilities. In order to get 
unbiased estimates of the quantities of interest, we take account of the modification 
introduced through accumulation of proper weights.         
The natural probability that the event occurs during any given interval is by 
definition equal to ΔP. For demand-based event, the natural frequency of the event is 
P. The demand-based and time-distributed events can be treated in the same manner, 
the only difference is the notation of the natural frequency. In the following 
discussion, we use the notation ΔP to represent the natural frequency. This is only for 
convenience, and the procedure can be applied to both demand-based event, and time-
distributed event.  
Since an event at tk is taken as representative for occurrence of the event 
anywhere during the interval, the probability of occurrence of the event will be taken 
as ΔP, and thus the probability of non-occurrence of the event as 1 – ΔP. 
In case of a random search, the two branches originating from a branch point are 
assumed to be visited with probability Q (occurrence of the event), and 1 – Q (non-
occurrence) respectively. Q can be used to control how often a particular branch is 
visited during the simulations, regardless of the actual probability of the branch.  







– Q) and (1 – ΔP), a weight factor must be applied to event sequences whenever a 
branch point is encountered. If the probability of a branch is ΔP, and the probability 
that the branch is generated equals Q, the probabilistic weight of the event sequence 





In case of a systematic exploration, both branches are visited. In this case, the 
correction takes place by multiplying the branch weights by P or (1 – ΔP), depending 
on the branch that is followed. These values are found by setting Q to 1 in the above 
equation. 
In the adaptive simulation, each time when a stochastic event is proposed to the 
scheduler, the statistical weight affected by the scheduling command is kept by the 
scheduler. The Q (probability that branch is explored) may vary each time. The 
algorithm stays the same. When the propose event is a probabilistic branching event, 
the actual probabilities (Pe) is associated with each possible outcomes, thus the 
weight is 
Q
pw ei = . 
By applying this weighting scheme to event sequences, the probability of the 
corresponding scenarios can be computed. Let each generated event sequence belong 

















If the scenarios are mutually exclusive, meaning that each event sequence belongs 
to exactly one scenario, the weights can be normalized into an estimated probability 
distribution over those scenarios 







In case of a random event sequence generation, ŝP  converges towards the true 
probability of the scenario as the number of simulated event sequences increases. 
With each simulated event sequence, WS increases on average by  
 ( )S i i
i
W w q sΔ = ⋅∑  
where  
 si, i = 1,…,n is the set of all event sequences that make up scenario S. 
 wi is the weight of sequence si, as defined above 
 q(si) is the frequency at which sequence si is generated. 
To prove that this weighting scheme allows us to compute the appropriate values 
of event sequence frequencies, and thus scenario probabilities, we consider an event 







and non-occurrence of any number of events Ai, i = 1,…,n. 
The expected (average) weight contribution of this event sequence to S is defined 
as 
 s s sw q w= ⋅  
where qs is the frequency at which s is generated, and ws is the weight that would be 
assigned to s if it were generated. Furthermore, we define ps to be the true frequency 
of s. We will show that  
 s sw p=  
For each event Ai, i = 1,…,n, s traverses zero or more intervals during which the 
event is not generated, possibly followed by an interval during which the event does 
take place. 
Consider an interval I during which the event is simulated to not take place. By 
definition, the probability that this is the case equals (1 – QI). Also by definition, the 
true probability that the event would not occur is (1 – ΔPI). Therefore, the branch rule 
modifies the frequency at which event sequences that involve the non-occurrence of 






























Therefore, the expected weight contributions of the event sequences remain 
constant 
 ' 's s s sw q w q⋅ = ⋅  
A similar argument can be made for intervals in which the event is simulated to 
occur. We find therefore that the average weight contribution sw  of an event 
sequence is constant, and does not depend on the values of DP and Q. 
Furthermore, we now that if for all intervals ΔPI = QI, the frequencies at which 
event sequences are generated equal their true frequencies, and that ws = 1. We see 
therefore that 
 1s s sw q p⋅ = ⋅  
and thus the expected weight contribution of an event sequence to a scenario must 
equal the event sequence’s frequency. 
In case of a systematic exploration, all sequences are generated, and thus qs = 1. 
The frequency of an event sequence is known immediately after it is generated. 








For an example of the weighting in case of a random search, see Figure 5.6.1. It 
shows four mutually exclusive scenarios that, for convenience purposes, correspond 
to the occurrence of the event during intervals 1, 2, 3, and 4. The ΔP for each scenario 
is chosen as 0.1. The Q for each scenario is chosen as 0.2. The figure lists the actual 
probabilities (Ps), the generation probabilities (Qs), the event sequence weight factors 
(w), and the product of Qs and w. 
         time  ⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯→ 
   
ΔP = 0.1, Q = 0.2 ΔP = 0.1, Q = 0.2 ΔP = 0.1, Q = 0.2 ΔP = 0.1, Q = 0.2
    
   
 
 S1  S2  S3  S4 
 
Ps 0.100 0.090 0.081 0.073 
Qs 0.200 0.160 0.128 0.102 
w 0.500 0.563 0.633 0.715 
W Qs 0.100 0.090 0.081 0.081 
Figure 5.6.1: Example of scenario quantification. 
We consider the weight factor for the scenario S3, in which failure takes place 
during the third interval. Due to the simplicity of the problem, we can compute the 
probability of this scenario to be 







The probability that a randomly generated event sequence belongs to the scenario 
is  
 3Pr ( ) (1 0.2) (1 0.2) 0.2 0.128Q S = − ⋅ − ⋅ =  
The weight factor of any such event sequence is 
 (1 0.1) (1 0.1) 0.1 0.633
(1 0.2) (1 0.2) 0.2
w − ⋅ − ⋅= =
− ⋅ − ⋅
 
As the fraction of generated sequences belonging to S3 approaches 0.128, the 
estimated probability 
3Ŝ
P approaches the scenario’s true probability 
 0.128 0.633 0.081⋅ =  
To summarize: let Pi be the probability associated with branch i originating from a 
given branch point.  Let Qi be the probability that the branch is explored. Then, the 
weight w of any event sequence originating from that branch must be multiplied by a 











In case of systematic exploration, Qi ≡ 1, and the normalization is not necessary, 
since probabilities should by definition add up to 1. 
5.7 Estimator of End State Probabilities 







information of the system vulnerability. This procedure is very similar to the 
importance sampling of Monte Carlo simulation. Each event sequence generated 
would have a statistical weight.  




















where pk is the probability of reach end state k, and the Wi is the statistical weight of 
simulated event sequence i.  
Lki  is system state function. Lki = 1, if the end state of ith event sequence is k, 
otherwise, Lki = 0. The system state function Li is equivalent to the system failure 
function in (Campioni & Vestrucci, 2004), but the system state function here can 
express multiple end state, and is not limited by the <success, failure> binary logic.  
The statistical weight Wi depends on the way that the event sequence is generated. 
The calculation has been discussed in 5.6.  
 
5.8 Simple Test Case 
A simple test case is constructed to test the efficiency of the new DPRA 







consists three items which follow the Weibull failure rate.  The system is built with 
redundancy, i.e., if one of the items fails the system will still function as normal, but 
if two or all the three items fail the system will fail.  The figure below shows the fault 






Figure 5.8.1 Fault Tree a Simple Test Case 
There are two different end states that we are interested i.e. failed or Success.  In 
this small system, we assume the components identically follows the Weibull failure 
rate, whose α = 5000, and β = 2.  The time span is 91 seconds.  Thus, the reliability of 
this 2-out-of-3 system is 0.997, and the probability of system failure with the time 
span is p = 0.003115.  
 
5.8.1 The plan.  
The plan for this case is very simple.  The combination of any two of the three 







the system will still function as designed.  
5.8.2 End State Probability Estimates. 
One important objective of the simulation is to estimate the probability of 
different scenarios accurately and quickly.  The estimation is shown in the Figure 
5.8.2. We can see the estimation converge to the real value.  With the plan the 
simulation estimation converges much faster than crude Monte Carlo simulation. If 
there is no acceleration, the component failure would happen to would only about 10 
times in 1000 event sequences generated.  With such low simulation which may result 
in interested scenario, it is hard to get the accurate estimation.  
The Figure 5.8.2 shows after the simulation generates 1000 sequences, the 





















1 62 123 184 245 306 367 428 489 550 611 672 733 794 855 916 977
 
Figure 5.8.2 The Estimation of the Probability of System Failure 
At the first part of simulation we can see the estimation "jumps", that is due to the 
fact the in the beginning we do not have many cases result in system failure, even 
only one sequence which results in system failure may change the estimation 
considerably.  After about 100 event sequences, the scheduler adjusts the simulation 
more efficiently, more effort was devoted to the exploration to the interested 
scenarios, instead of repeating the scenario without any component failure over and 
over again.  
If we simulate the system in a non-biased Monte Carlo manner, the estimator of 
















== 1 , 
where ( ) 1=ixh , when the system fails, otherwise, ( ) 0=ixh    
The variance of the ( )ixh  is p(1-p), where p is the system failure probability. The 
1s (68% confidence) convergence envelop of the estimator is ( )
n
pp −⋅ 1 . After1000 
simulation runs, the 68% confidence envelop of the failure probability estimator 
would be ( ) 27.131.31 −±−=−⋅± ee
n
ppp , which implies a relative error of more 
than 50%. The large variance is due to the fact the failure is rare under unbiased 
simulation, and it is expected to observe only 3 failures in 1000 simulation runs.  
This example shows that the guided simulation improved the efficiency and 
accuracy considerably.  
5.8.3 Distribution of Sequences 
The table below shows the simulation result of a test case which set all the 
scenarios in the plan with the same importance level.  With these setting, the 
scheduler will distribute the simulation effort according to the "value" of different 
scenarios, favoring the scenarios with higher value, which is more likely to increase 







From the table we can see, that the "two-component failure" scenario, which will 
lead to system failure was acerbated with a very high magnitude, while the "one-
component failure" was also accelerated, but with a much lower magnitude.  It is also 
clear the "no component failure" scenario, which happens with the highest probability 
was decelerated.  
Table 5-3 Distribution of Event Sequences 







Two Components Failure 486 48.6% 0.3% 162 
One Component Failure 394 39.4% 9.2% 4.28 
No Component Failure 120 12% 90.5% 0.133 
Also, we notice that the acceleration factor for “two component failure” and “one 
component failure” is very different. This cannot be achieved by simply accelerating 
the component failure rate. This shows the capability of the scheduler to distribute the 
event sequences “fairly” among scenarios.  
5.8.4 The Impact of Importance Factor 
The decision of which scenario to explore is not only based on the value of 
scenario, but also the "importance" level.  It is desirable to run the simulation with 








If we change importance setting of "two-component failure" to "high" and "no 
component failure" to "low", we would see the distribution of event sequences 
summarized in the table below.  
Table 5-4 Distribution of Event Sequences 







Two Components Failure 572 57.20% 0.30% 190 
One Component Failure 374 37.40% 9.20% 4.1 
No Component Failure 54 5.4% 90.50% 0.0597 
Compared to the results reported in Table 5-3, the scenarios with "high" 
importance level were accelerated with an even higher acceleration factor, while the 
low importance scenarios were decelerated more. This feature cannot be achieved by 
biased Monte Carlo which simply accelerates the component failures. In that type of 
Monte Carlo simulation, the event sequences distribution among scenarios is direct 
result of acceleration at component level. Typically, the acceleration of one 








6. Introduction to SIMPRA 
6.1 Overview 
6.1.1 Framework of SIMPRA 
Simulation-based Probabilistic Risk Analysis (SIMPRA) is a software package 
which implements the methodology proposed in Chapter 5. It is developed in Java 
and MATLAB® / Simulink general purpose simulation environment. SIMPRA is a 
general purpose PRA platform. It provides a DPRA library, with which the user can 
easily build DPRA simulation models in Simulink.  
SIMPRA is a software package implementing the methodology we proposed in 
chapter 4 and 5. The key components of SIMPRA are: 
 Planner 
 Scheduler 
 Simulation Model 
 Output Analysis 
The SIMPRA simulation model is built in MATLAB® / Simulink environment 
and the Scheduler and Planner is developed in Java. Matlab can import the Java class 







different methods of the scheduler class, to generate the branching points, and get 
exploration commands from scheduler. Scheduler would control the occurrence and 
timing of events at the branching points. The interactions between different blocks of 
SIMPRA are depicted in Figure 6.1.1.  
 
Figure 6.1.1 Framework of SIMPRA 
 
6.1.2 Object-Oriented Paradigm 
Object Oriented originally is a paradigm for writing programs. It has been widely 
accepted and supported in programming practice and it has been also applied in other 







well as defines its behavior. The simulation model consists of an integration of 
objects. The components of the system are defined by instantiating of the objects.  
We will borrow some concepts of object oriented paradigm in our modeling 
procedure.  
 Abstraction 
An object is an abstraction of an entity in the real world. To deal with the 
complexity of the real world, we form abstraction of the things in it. In object-
oriented paradigm, abstraction is the analysis that what a class knows (attributes) or 
does (methods). The abstraction includes all the attributes and methods of interest to 
the application, and the rest is ignored.  
 Encapsulation 
In the object-oriented world, the systems are modularized into classes, which, in 
turn, are modularized into methods and attributes. Encapsulation is the design how 
functionality is compartmentalized within system. The implication of encapsulation is 
that the implementation can be built in any way and then later changes of the 
implementation will not affect other parts of the system. The details of the 
implementation of an item is hidden form the users of that items.  
 Information Hiding 







methods is restricted. If one class wants information of another class, it should have 
to ask for it, not simply taking it. The purpose of information hiding is to make 
certain details inaccessible so that they should not affect other parts of a system. 
 Object-Oriented Simulation 
In an OO modeling simulation paradigm, objects are constructed to represent real-
world entities that can interact with each other. The interactions are modeled as 
communications, where “messages” are exchanged between different objects. 
“Messages” here can represent the transfer of all kinds of entities, for example, 
information, materials, or energy. When an object receives a message, the response 
could be altering its internal state (i.e. the underlying behavior changes in a 
fundamental way), altering its important characteristics (attributes), and/or generating 
outbound messages to communicate its conditions to other objects in the model. The 
way in which the object responds to messages depends on the message it receives, its 
internal processes and on its internal state. One basic idea of object-oriented is 
encapsulation, which means the behavior of a component or subsystem entirely are 
enclosed within the confines of a self-contained object. The model of the entire 
system is created by combining and connecting the object models, and enabling the 
individual object models to communicate with one another in a way such that it 
faithfully duplicates the behavior in the real-world system.  







the relationships between objects. Each component is embodied in an object model. 
The object model represents a description of its behavior and its interaction with 
outside world. The object’s information, events and actions are available to other 
objects only through specified interface.  This feature, referred to as “encapsulation”, 
is one of the underlying principles of object oriented paradigm. It helps to minimize 
the network when we are developing the model. Parts of the information is hidden, 
the interface of each module is designed is such a way that as little as possible about 
the inner working is revealed. As a result, the traffic between different parts of the 
work is minimized.  
The inheritance is another key feature of object-oriented. It enables the analyst to 
declare an object whose common Attributes and methods are specified once, and 
extends and specialize those attributes and methods into specific cases. A number of 
objects are created and stored in the library. The objects in the library are reusable in 
different applications. The scale of reusability may differ. Some of the objects are 
universal, such as different failure modes, such as Weibull failure. These objects can 
be reused in any applications. Some objects may be application oriented. The engine 
of a space shuttle can also be an object, but only reusable in shuttle related 
applications.  
One of major challenge faced by risk analyst is that the complex interactions in 







burden of the system analysts to identify all kinds of interactions and their possible 
consequences. By contrast, in the object oriented simulation model the interactions 
are depicted as the “messages” communicated between objects and the response to 
the messages.  There is virtually no limitations of what kind of interactions can be 
modeled. All kinds of the interactions can be easily reproduced in the model. Another 
benefit is that this approach frees the modeler from the burden of defining all possible 
scenarios and/or generating the graph contains all the states of the system (as in state 
transition graph).  
 
6.2 Planner 
Plan is a map to guide the exploration. The Planner is a module of SIMPRA to 
generate such a map. Planner collects useful knowledge about the contributors to 
different classes of risk scenarios and generates the roadmap for the simulation.  
In using the Planner, the first step is for the users to construct an abstract model of 
the system. The abstract model consists of a state transition diagram, a component 
tree, and a functionality tree. The component tree is used to establish relationships among 
various sub-systems and components involved in the system. A sub-component node can 
further have sub-components. The functionality tree is used to establish the relationships 








Figure 6.2.1 Component Tree 
The component tree and functionality tree are used to define relationships between 
components and their associated processes (see Figure 6.2.1). The state transition diagram 
is used to draw the required state-relationship, associate them with the selected components 
and functionalities from the component-functionality matrix, and then generate a plan (see 
Figure 6.2.2).  
Shows the names of the system, 
sub-systems and components. 
The node names must be named 
as per the naming guideline. 
“AND” or “OR” gates show the 
logical relationship between a 
sub-system and its components. 
Popup Menu to add, modify and 
delete nodes. In addition a drag 
and drop implementation for 









Figure 6.2.2 State Relationship Diagram Editor 
The component tree and functionality tree are stored in a database file. The planner would 
query the database file while generating the plans.  
The implementation of planner is a companion research of this dissertation, and the 








6.3.1 Functions of Scheduler 
The scheduler is an implementation of the scheduling algorithms introduced in 
Chapter 5. The current implementation of the Scheduler consists of a set of Java 
classes. The Scheduler is used to control the simulation model which is implemented 
in Simulink, but the scheduler does not contain code that is specific to Simulink 
models. If it is implemented in Matlab, the simulation model can call the Java class 
directly by importing the archived jar file. There is no function for the Scheduler to 
call the simulation model directly.  
Core classes in current implementation are in the ‘scheduler’ package: 
• Scheduler: provides interfacing with the simulation model 
• MaxValueStrategy: implementation of the scheduling principles as discussed 
in section 5.5 and the systematic traversal discussed in section 5.6. 
• ScenarioNode: used to construct the tree structure which represents the 
‘plan’, i.e., set of scenarios, the algorithm has been discussed in section 5.3. 
• ScenarioNodeLogic: implementations of this interface represent the different 








The following scheduler functions would be called during simulation: 
• Scheduler.getBranch(): Initialization; call the scheduler to get the branching 
information of stochastic events , the algorithm is discussed in the section 5.4. 
• Scheduler.proposeTransition(): When reaching a branch point, the 
simulation model calls the scheduler for exploration command and updating the 
branching information; the algorithm of scheduling has been discussed in section 5.5. 
• Scheduler.Notify(): Event notification; the algorithm has been discussed in 
section 5.7 
• Scheduler.NotifyEndState(): When simulation reaching an end state; the 
simulation model calls the scheduler to notify end state, and calculate the sequence 
weight and the algorithm has been discussed in section 5.7.  
All the interfaces between simulation model and scheduler class are encapsulated 
in the DPRA library block. The users do not have to program the interface. They only 
need to specify the stochastic parameters in the simulation model.  
6.3.2 Systematic Exploration 
SIMPRA also supports the systematic exploration strategy as in the Discrete 
Dynamic Event Tree (DDET) methods. There are two types of systematic exploration 







second type is the systematic search for specific events. The types of systematic 
exploration are indicated in the plan.  
Once a branch point is reached and branches are proposed to the Scheduler, the 
Scheduler would explore all proposed branches. The exploration of event sequences 
is managed in a depth-first manner, as in ADS. At the branch point, the current 
system state at the branch point and all the branches are stored in a database, and the 
first branch is executed and the simulation continues. When an end state is reached, 
scheduler goes one step back to the previous branch point. If at least one branch still 
remains to be explored, the scheduler would retrieve the state of the branch point to 
re-initialize the simulation, and explore the new branch. The simulation is restarted 
until another end state is reached. When all possible branches of that branch point 
have been explored, the scheduler brings the simulator one step backwards, until the 
dynamic tree exploration is completed.  
As in ADS, there is a user-defined parameter Plim. If the probability of branch gets 
lower the Plim, that branch is no longer simulated. The probabilities of such event 
sequences are collected as “truncated” in the scheduler. We want to keep sum of the 
truncated probabilities low; otherwise it may introduce significant error in the 
estimator.  
Another difference between systematic search supported by SIMPRA and the ADS 







5.4, as opposed to only at the predefined points as in DYLAM or ADS.  
If we are performing a full scale systematic search, the event sequences are generated 
and explored in a systematic way. Users define the number of event sequences they 
want to generate. The number of event sequences generated by the exploration of one 
round is limited by the number branch point generated during the simulation, and may 
be lower than the user defined number. The systematic search will go on for another 
round until the number of event sequences is greater than that designated by the user.  
 
Figure 6.3.1 Partial systematic search 
Figure 6.3.1 illustrates an example of partial systematic search. The dashed lines 
represent the branches not being explored. One node has been explored 
systematically, which means, all possible branches originated from that node are 
explored. The nodes before or following this node are still explored randomly. If the 
partial type of systematic search is performed, only the branches proposed by the 
designated events would be proposed systematically. The other branches would still 







carry a statistical weight as the discussed in 5.6. 
6.4 Structure of the Simulation Model 
6.4.1 Simulation Model 
SIMPRA relies on an executable model of the system, which emulates the system 
behavior. Given the operational profile and adequate input, we assume that this model 
would reproduce the behavior of the real system under the specific circumstances.  
The model is an abstraction of the real system. The abstract level may change 
during the course of the risk analysis. When we have better understanding of the 
system, or at later stage of system development, we may replace the existing model 
with a more detailed model.  
In a typical DPRA problem, the system under investigation consists of discrete 
component state and continuous process variables. The evolution of continuous 
process variables are governed by the deterministic physical and logical laws. 
Physical processes are described using mathematical expressions of such laws. The 
components have discrete states, which represent a set of operational modes or 
configurations. The component state may change from one state to another. This 
change may be internally determined by the system logic and/or physical laws, or 
described by statistical or probabilistic laws. The occurrence of discrete state 







the mathematical equations describing their behavior in each state. Examples of 
stochastic events include component malfunction with time-to-failure following a 
Weibull distribution. One example of deterministic event is the fuse in circuit melting 
when the electrical current reaches a certain level. 
 
Figure 6.4.1 The Interaction between the discrete model and Continuous model. 
The model is a combination of both deterministic and stochastic models (Figure 
6.4.1). The stochastic process dynamically interact with the continuous-time, 
deterministic processes. The interactions between them consist of at least: 
• The state of the discrete system determines the boundary conditions of the 
continuous-time process; 
• The continuous-time process, e.g. the system dynamics, such as pressure 







• The continuous-time process may generate events, which in turn change 
the discrete state of the system.  
The simulation model consists of hardware, software and human crew. Modeling 
choices for hardware systems are well established in most cases. 
The evolution of the model is traced by solving the continuous-time system in the 
intervals between the discrete events generated by the discrete system. Whenever the 
time for a scheduled event is reached, the continuous-time simulation is stopped, and 
the corresponding event is executed. In some cases, the continuous-time system may 
generate an event, e.g. one of the variables crosses a given threshold.  
The scheduler only directs the behavior of the stochastic model. There is no direct 
interaction between the scheduler and continuous-time deterministic model.  
6.4.2 Interactions between Planner, Scheduler and Simulation Model 
At the beginning of each simulation, the scheduler will load the plan from the 
plan file generated by the planner. The plan file is a text file, where the scenarios of 
interest are listed line by line.  
As we have discussed in 4.6, the Planner may work at higher (more abstract) 
level. The scenarios generated in the plan may include high level events which are not 
directly represented in the simulation model. Such high level events would be 







of the engine failure. The detailed scenarios are used by the scheduler to guide the 
simulation. A database is maintained by the risk analysts to interpret the abstract 
scenarios generated by planner. When the scheduler loads the plan, if there are such 
abstract scenarios, the scheduler will query the database to get the detailed scenarios, 
and generate a detailed plan, which can be used to direct the simulation.  
Also we have discussed in 4.7 that the plan is updated from time to time during 
the simulation. In the SIMPRA Navigator the user would specify the number of event 
sequences of one updating interval, and number of updating rounds. The planner will 
check the simulation results at the end each updating interval to determine how well 
the simulation is following the plan. If some scenarios have been underrepresented, 
the planner would automatically set the importance level of the specific scenarios to a 
higher level, which would in turn make the scenarios more favorable by the 
scheduler. The purpose of this adjustment is to maintain the exploration fairly 
distributed among different scenarios.  
6.5 Simulation Model Building 
MATLAB® is a computer language for technical computing. Simulink, which is 
a toolbox extension of MATLAB, is a software package for modeling, simulating, 
and analyzing dynamic systems. An icon-driven interface is used to construct a block 







and an output. A comprehensive block library of sinks, sources, linear and nonlinear 
components, and connectors is provided. The modeling of the time-dependent 
mathematical relationships among the system's inputs, states, and outputs is 
constructed in the form of block diagram, with blocks representing functional 
elements, and lines representing signals between those blocks.  
6.5.1 The Library to Build the Simulation Model: 
The SIMPRA provide a library for the analyst to build the DPRA model. The 
basic elements required to build the DPRA are provided in the library as blocks. 
Users can simply click and drag the blocks into the model they are building. The 
blocks include different failure modes, interface with scheduler, and system logic.  
The users can build such library blocks by themselves, or modify from the existing 
library blocks. Table 6-1 lists some of the elements available in SIMRPA library.  
Table 6-1 Examples of the Elements of SIMPRA Library 
Logic Gate AND, OR, k-OUT-OF-n, if 
Dynamic Fault Tree Gate Functional Dependency, Spare, Priority-AND 
Failure Rate Weibull Failure Rate, Exponential Failure Rate 
Failure Modes Time-distributed, demand-base, Repairable.  









Figure 6.5.1 SIMPRA Library 
The interface between the simulation model and the scheduler is encapsulated in 
the library blocks. The user cannot see the interface and there is no need for the users 
to program the interface at all. Only the parameters of the components need to be 
specified.  
Dynamic Fault Tree Library 
Dynamic Fault tree Library is part of the DPRA library. Several dynamic fault 
tree gates are implemented. A major disadvantage of traditional fault-tree analysis is 
that it is incapable of capturing sequence dependencies in the system and still 
allowing an analytic solution. Several new dynamic fault tree gates were designed to 







the fault tree is converted to a Markov chain, instead of the usual fault-tree solution 
methods. The gates provide a compact way to represent certain sequence 
dependencies. In a simulation environment, as we have discussed, there is no 
limitation for modeling the dependency. All possible sequence timing dependencies 
can be modeled explicitly. Reproducing the dynamic gates in the simulation 
environment gives the users an easy and compact way to represent some frequently 
seen types of dependencies, just as in the dynamic fault tree. The capability of model 
dependencies and other dynamic features of SIMPRA are far beyond the dynamic 
fault tree gates we list here. The Markov assumption in the Dynamic Fault Tree is 
also lifted here. The gates in SIMPRA represent the same logic of the dynamic tree 
gates, but they do not require Markov assumptions. Unlike the fault tree, which is 
failure oriented, in SIMPRA the state of the component is typically success oriented. 
In fault tree, including dynamic fault tree, when we say the output of a gate is true 
implies failure events happen. While in SIMPRA, a positive number implies that the 
component is working, and zero implies failure. The user can define specific numbers 
to represent different degraded state. So in SIMPRA environment using the dynamic 
tree gates may be a little confusing. The other Boolean logic gates should also receive 








Table 6-2 Dynamic Fault Tree 





The occurrence of some 
trigger event causes other 
dependent components to 
become inaccessible or 
unusable. The dependent 
component events (failure) are 
forced when trigger event 
occurs. 
Spare Gate Spares are components which 
replace the primary unit, if the 
primary unit fails. The output 





The output of the gate is true if 
both of the following 
conditions are satisfied: 
- Both A and B have occurred, 
- A occurs before B. 
 
i. Functional-Dependency Gates 
In SIMPRA, a functional dependency gate has two inputs, the trigger event and 
dependent event. They represent the working/failure state of components. If the first 
input change from 1 to 0, which implies component failure, it is equivalent to “trigger 







components. If trigger event occurs, the dependent components fail. The dependent 
components may have other failure or degradation modes. The input of dependent 
events may be multi-dimensional, and represent many components.  
ii. Spare Gate 
In SIMPRA, a spare gate has two inputs, the primary component and spare 
component. They represent the working/failure state of components. Initially the 
primary input is 1, meaning that the primary unit is working. The output is also 1. If 
the first input change from 1 to 0, it implies that primary unit fails. If the spare unit 
successfully replaces the primary unit, the output is the state of the spare unit, 
otherwise the output is 0. The dynamic fault tree has three distinctive spare gates: hot, 
warm, and cold. Different types of spare will be translated into quite different Markov 
chains. In the simulation environment, the component failure behavior is the 
characteristic of the component, whether it is before or after the activation. In 
SIMPRA, the spare gate only represents the system configuration. There is no need 
for separate gates of different spare types. The spare units can be cold, warm or hot. 
The only different between these spare types is that they have different 
failure/degradation behavior before it is activated. The system logic will not be 
influenced by this, and it is represented by the same spare gate.  
iii. Priority-And Gate 







second component. They represent the working/failure state of components. Initially 
both inputs are 1, meaning that the units are working. The output is also 1. If input 
changes from 1 to 0, it implies that the corresponding unit fails. The output stands for 
the system state. Only when both units fail and fail the exact order, the output will 
change to 0 at the failure of the second component.  



















6.5.2 Running the Simulation: 
Figure 6.5.2 shows the SIMPRA Navigator. The names of parameters are self-
explaining. Users need to specify the parameters, number of event sequences, name 
of the plan file, etc. Users can initiate the planner by clicking the “Generate Plan” 
button. User can input the component tree, functionality tree and the state diagram as 
we have discussed in 6.2.  
 








Clicking “Start Simulation” button would start the simulation. The simulation will 
read the plan file and initialize the scheduler. A window will pop up at the beginning 
the simulation (see Figure 6.5.3). It displays the simulation results dynamically. The 
left upper window shows the estimate of end state probabilities. Right upper window 
shows the details of generated event sequences. The lower part shows the how event 
sequences distributed among the scenarios in the plan. We can see the expected 
information gain and number of sequences already generated in each scenario.  
 
Figure 6.5.3 Runtime GUI 
The simulation result is stored in a text file, for later investigation. The probability 
estimation plot and event sequences details are dynamical updated in a pop window.  
When simulation finishes, we can see the result. The End State Display GUI 







6.5.4). In addition to the above displaying capabilities the Display has a built in 
filtering capability, which can be used to filter a sequence, or a set of sequences, e.g. 
if the user is interested in displaying only sequences which have the expression 
“AOG”. The user types in “AOG” on the text field provided and only sequences 
which contain the term “AOG” are displayed. 
 
Figure 6.5.4 End State Display 
 
6.5.3 Hardware Component Failure Modeling 







events, especially the transitions of system state, such as hardware failure.  
When we are building the simulation model, it is assumed that the hardware 
components have a finite number of states, e.g. working, failed, degraded. 
Furthermore, we assume that the transition from one state to another is instantaneous. 
To implement the hardware failure in the model, we use the branching rules described 
in the previous sections.  
 
Figure 6.5.5 A Typical Hardware runtime failure block 
In the figure above, the “Time” port is the input port of the module. The “Weibull 
Failure Rate” and “Time Distributed Event” are blocks of the SIMPRA library. The 
“Weibull Failure Rate” is an example of the failure rate calculation block, which is 
responsible for calculating the failure rate the components. Such blocks may require 







failure distribution will be input by the users. The “Time Distributed Event” block is 
a branch generation block, which generates branch point according the rules we have 
discussed in Chapter 5. Whenever a branching point is reached, this block will 
communicate with the “scheduler”. The output of this block is the current state of the 
component, designated by an integer. 
6.5.4 Event Notification 
 
Figure 6.5.6 Event Notification Block 
Event state notification blocks monitor the occurrence of events that can not be 
directly controlled, e.g., physical conditions, indirect failure of systems. This kind of 
events may play an important role in the system’s dynamic evolution. For example, if 
the pressure reaches a threshold, the wall of the tank may rupture. In such situations, 
the plan would specify such events, and scheduler would thus monitor the 
occurrences. In the simulation model, “Event State Notification” blocks notify the 








6.5.5 System State Block 
The system consists of a number of components, which may interact with each other. 
The hardware interacts with the other modules of the system, such as human and 
software modules. The output of the state variable would be fed into other blocks or 
modules of the model. The state of the components will influence the behavior of 
corresponding components, such as thrust provided by main engine, which in turn 
may result in the transition of the state of the system.  
The State Logic Blocks determine the system or sub-system states by analyzing 
the components states, using the logic operation gates, provided in standard Simulink 
library or the SIMPRA block-set library, or user defined s-functions. The logic 
operation gates provided in the Simulink standard library includes the Boolean 
operations: AND gate, OR gate, NOT gate and etc. The SIMPRA block-set library 
provides the k-out-of-n gate, which is more generic, and the Dynamic Fault Tree 









Figure 6.5.7 Example of Hardware State Logic 
Note that although the gates in SIMPRA look like the fault tree gates, the logic is 
slightly different than those in the fault trees. Fault trees are failure oriented. Our 
simulation model is not limited to failure only. In a fault tree gate, if the output is 
true, that means component failure. In SIMPRA, often the opposite is the case. 
Typically, 0 implies failure, and 1 implies working. The state of the SIMPRA block is 
not limited by binary states. The components can have multiple states defined by 
users. 
If the state logic requires more complex logic operations, such as time condition, 
a user-defined s-function would be more appropriate. S-functions can be written in 
different computer languages, including MATLAB®, C, C++, Ada, or FORTRAN. S-







place between the solvers and built-in Simulink blocks. User can implement 
algorithms in an S-function. A customized user-interface can be obtained by writing 
an S-function and placing its name in an S-Function block (available in the User-
Defined Functions block library).  
6.5.6 End State Notification 
End state notifications cause the simulation of a sequence to stop when a predefined 
condition is reached in the system. The simulated event sequence would be stored for 
later study.  
 
 
Figure 6.5.8 End State Block 
The “End State Logic” block is an instance of “System State Logic” block. It may use 







state is reached or not and which end state is reached. When an end state is reached, 
the simulation is stopped, and the scheduler is notified.  The scheduler will record the 
event sequence of this round of simulation, and start the simulation again.  
6.5.7 Human Behavior Modeling 
The objective of the human model is to simulate human behavior and the 
interaction between human and other parts of the system. The human model receives 
system information as inputs, and outputs the human action.  
The current human model is based on previous IDAC, ADS-IDAC model 
(Mosleh & Chang, 2004). IDAC is a model of human error. IDAC uses a 
representation of human behavior in information processing (I) problem 
solving/decision making (D), and performing tasks (A), in order to develop an 
explanation of the likely response of a crew (C). 
The human model consists of two modules: the information processing behavior 
module and the knowledge representation module. The information processing 
behavior module simulates the information processing of the human crew. It 
simulates that a given information processing strategy which action the human will 
take and estimates the associated probabilities. An often used approach of cognition 
modeling is by means of Performance Influencing Factors (PIFs) or Performance 







factors like stress, level of attention and time constraints. The human model estimates 
the probability of possible human actions, based on the states and values of the PIFs.  
 
Figure 6.5.9 High level view of the IDAC response model (Mosleh & Chang, 2004) 
The knowledge representation module simulates the human knowledge base (i.e., 
memory). The individual gathers cues about the system’s status and searches his/her 
memory to establish which action is most appropriate for the situation. However, the 
way the memory is searched depends on the problem solving strategy adopted. 
The memory is classified into long term memory and short term memory. The 
knowledge base (long-term memory) is where all the knowledge and experiences 







memory may contain the understanding of the functional characteristics of the system 
and its underlying physical processes; guidelines on how to respond to accidents, and 
expected response of system to perturbations, learned through training and operating 
experience (Mosleh & Chang, 2004). 
The quantity and quality of information accumulated in the long-term memory 
reflects the level of experience and training of an individual. The knowledge base has 
a great impact on how an individual will deal with threatening encounters. The 
working memory (also called short-term memory), as the name suggests, decays 
quickly. In addition, the capacity is very limited.  
In many human reliability models, human error probability (HEPs) are calculated 
as a function of PIFs, and one common assumption made is that the PIFs are 
independent. For example, in one method, the HEP is assumed to be a function of the 
weighed sum of the effects of the PIFs, by combining them in the linear formulation 
of equation. Such assumption does reflect the reality. For example, stress cannot be 
independent of task complexity or information load. Another negative aspect of these 
techniques is that they don't provide any explicit description of how the PIFs 
influence human performance.  
The Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) approach is an alternative, and is used in 
SIMPRA human models. It uses the PIFs to estimate the likelihood that a specific 







calculation of HEPs. All the PIFs are arranged in a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN), 
where each node represents one PIF, and the connections between them represent 
their affects in each other. Figure 6.5.10 shows an example of how BBN model the 
relationship among PIFs.  
 
Figure 6.5.10 The BBN framework 
For details of human modeling, see (Mosleh et al., 2005) 
6.5.8 Software Modeling 
A significant number of system failures can be attributed to software malfunction. 
It is thus imperative to take account of the software behavior and model the impact of 
software on system evolution to correctly represent the risk scenarios. Research has 







(Li, Li, Ghose, & Smidts, 2003; Li, Li, & Smidts, 2004, 2005). Past effort have 
focused on the software testing (Li, 2004). In this research, we put the software in the 
context of system dynamic evolution.  
In the DPRA environment, we first construct an executable software model to 
simulate the software behaviors. Different methodologies exist for software 
modeling, including finite state charts (Harel, 1987), UML (Fowler & Scott, 1999), 
pattern concept (Gamma, Helm, Johnson, & Vlissides, 1995). A broad categorization 
divides these and other methods into those that are based on the data flow inside 
software, and represent the software through decomposition of system into dataflow 
diagrams that captures the successive transformations of system input into system 
output, and those that model the procedural stages of the software, represented in the 
form of states and transitions between these states, leading to some kind of finite state 
chart. Finite State Machine (FSM) is chosen to build the software behavior model. 
The analysts’ task is to build an executable software model and identify possible 
software related initiating events. The simulation environment will explore the 
scenario space based on the system model. The software risk and vulnerabilities will 
be identified using the simulation results. The analyst no longer needs to study the 
fault propagation and enumerate all the possible accident sequences.  
The software behavior model is a combination of a deterministic model and 







software, as well as the interaction between the software and the other parts of the 
system. The stochastic model represents the uncertain behavior of the software. The 
software related failure modes can be identified in a similar way as in the traditional 
PRA framework. The selected failure modes will be super imposed on the executable 
behavior model as stochastic events, and are controlled by the simulation scheduler 
during simulation based on the predefined rules to explore the risk scenarios space 









7. Application I – Hold Up Tank 
7.1 Introduction 
Holdup tanks are widely used in different engineered systems, and actually the 
control of liquid level in the tank is one of the oldest control problems. Variations of 
holdup tank problem have been widely discussed in the dynamic PRA literatures. 
Aldemir used a hypothetical holdup tank problem as an example for his dynamic 
approach based on Markov chain to analyze process control systems dynamics 
(Aldemir, 1987). In (Deoss & Siu, 1989) the same problem was studied using 
DYMCAM (Dynamic Monte Carlo Availability Model ). Later Siu studied the 
problem to demonstrate different dynamic PRA methods (Siu, 1994). Cojazzi applied 
DYLAM to study similar tank control risk analysis (Cojazzi, 1996). (Dutuit et al., 
1997) use Petri nets to study a similar problem with Markov assumptions. 
7.1.1 Outline of the Holdup Tank 
Figure 8.1.1 shows the layout of the simple tank system. The tank holds liquid 
chemicals, and liquid level is regulated by the actions of the control loops. At time = 







the same amount of liquid as that flow out through the valve, and therefore the level 
is maintained constant. If a failure of the components happens, the level of tank 
changes, and the control system may intervene. The events when the tank level (L) 
rises above a certain level (overflow), or falls below a certain level (dry-out), are 
considered to be a system failure. The time-dependent probabilities of “overflow” and 
“dry-out” are quantities of interest.  
 
Figure 7.1.1  Holdup Tank System Layout 
 
In all the following studies we have made these assumptions: 
1) The pumps and the valve have separate level sensors.  
2) The control units of pumps and valve are activated by the level signal. 







3) Failures are not repairable.  
4) The units are either On or Off. 
5) The flow rate of the pumps and valve is constant when they are on.  
7.1.2 Dynamic Feature of the Holdup Tank Problem 
In the holdup tank problem, timing and order of failures are critical to system 
safety. The accident initiated by the failure of the pump would be quite different from 
the one initiated by the failure of the valve. The system control relies on the process 
variables, so it would be oversimplifying the problem if we neglect the process 
variables in the analysis.  
Siu first analyzed the tank problem with traditional event tree methods (Siu, 1994). 
This analysis showed that the event tree analysis can display the correct failure logic 
of dynamic systems, but by ignoring the process variable, it cannot determine the 
distribution of time to an undesirable state. The event tree is basically a Boolean logic, 
so the only way event tree can take the process variable into account is by discretizing 
the process variables ranges. When we need detail process variables or when the 
number of variables increases, the event tree may grow unmanageable. Furthermore, 
without a physical model the event tree analysis has to involve subjective judgment of 
the interaction between variables. As a result the assessment of the probability of 







Cojazzi has reported that with long time constant, there would be a significant 
difference between the results obtained from static fault tree methods and DYLAM.  
In the following sections we will build several different simulation models with 
additional assumptions. The simulation model is based the SIMPRA DPRA platform. 
The user can set up the parameters in the model, which include the flow rates of 
pumps and valve, the capacity of tank, the set points of the control system and other 
parameters depicting the failure characteristics. A Weibull failure model is used of 
the pumps and the valve to simulate the failure modes. We can set parameters and 
slightly modify the model to model different systems in the following case studies. 
 







7.2 Case I 
7.2.1 Problem Statement 
This case is a reproduction of case F in (Aldemir, 1987) and case 1 in (Cojazzi, 
1996). Additional assumptions in this case are: 
1) System set points and corresponding control laws shown in Table 3-1. 
2) Flow rate of valve and Pump1 is 0.06 m/h, and for Pump2, 0.03m/h. 
3) All failure rates are constant, in time. The failure rate for valve h320/11 =λ , 
pump1 is h219/12 =λ , and pump2, h175/13 =λ . 
4) If the failure occurs, the unit works on the contrary to the control signal.  
5) If the liquid level is greater than 3, the system fails by “overflow”, and if the 
liquid level is less than -3, the system fails by “dry-out”.  
Table 7.1 Control Laws as a Function of Liquid Level 
Level Valve Pump1 Pump2 
L≤ 1  Open On On 
-1 ≤ L ≤ 1  Open On Off 








7.2.2 Analysis in Previous Work 
In this case Pump 2 is not sufficient to restore the system to nominal state if the 
valve “fails on” when Pump 1 “fails off” (dry-out), or when the Pump 1 “fail on” 
when valve “fails off” (overflow). A further assumption was made in (Aldemir, 1987) 
that no failure occurs following a component failure until the system enters a new 
control region. Figure 8.2.1 illustrates two accident scenarios under this assumption. .   
 
Figure 7.2.1 A Typical History of Tank Level Evolution 
The two accident scenarios depicted in the figure are triggered by Pump1 failure 
first or valve failure first: 
i. The water level drops when Pump 1 fails off, while the valve is 
still open. No other component failures occur until the valve closes 
when the set point is reached. After that, if the valve fails (fails on), 







ii. The water level rises when the valve fails off, while Pump1 is still 
on. No other component failures occur until Pump1 is turned off 
when the set point is reached. After that, if the Pump1 fails (fails 
on), the tank will overflow.  
If we lift the assumption that no failure occurs following a component failure until 
the system enters a new control region, there are several new scenarios: 
i. Given Pump1 fails off, if valve fails when the liquid level is still 
dropping (fails off), then the system is still under control. After that if 
Pump2 fails, the tank overflows. 
ii. Given Pump1 fails off first, if Pump2 fails (fails on) when the liquid 
level is still dropping, it will take longer for the liquid level to reach the 
set point to shut the valve. If the valve fails before the liquid level 
reaches the set point (fails off), then the tank overflows.  
iii. Given valve fails off first, if pump2 fails (fails on) when the liquid level 
is still dropping, it will take less time for the liquid level to reach the 
setting point to shut the valve. If the valve fails before the liquid level 
reaches the set point (fails off), then the system still under control. After 
that if pump2 fails, the tank overflow. 







rising (fails off), then the system still remains under control. After that if 
Pump2 fails, the tank overflows.   
We can see that if we remove the additional assumptions, even if Pump 1 fails 
before valve fails, the tank may overflow instead of drying-out. If the valve fails off 
before Pump 1 or 2 fails, it is impossible for the tank to dry-out. The time window for 
any component to fail between one component failure and reaching another control 
region is relatively short (about 20 hours) compared to the MTTF of the components 
involved. Neglecting such scenarios would not lead to significant error.  
With this assumption, an approximated solution is: 














Note that the equation implies that when the cut-set occurs, the top event occurs 
simultaneously. In this case, we must consider sequence. “Pump1 failure followed by 
valve failure” is the cut-set leading to dry-out, while “valve failure followed by pump 
1 failure” is the cut-set leading to overflow. We know, however, there is a time delay 
for the top event to happen. If we are calculating asymptotic values of CDF for very 












−− λλλλ λλ dteeF ttdryout    (7.1) 





−− λλλλ λλ dteeF ttoverflow    (7.2) 
Equations 7.1 and 7.2 are used in (Aldemir, 1987) and (Cojazzi, 1996).  
Figure 8.2.2 shows the result reported in (Aldemir, 1987) and (Cojazzi, 1996).  
 
Figure 7.2.2 Others Work 
7.2.3 Simulation with SIMPRA 
A SIMPRA simulation model built with the same parameters used by others. 
Because the mission time is much longer than the MTTF, it is assumed that at least 
two components fail during the mission. We run the simulation with a simple plan 
which numerates all possible event sequences: 







 Valve failure, pump1 failure  
 Pump 1 failure, Pump 2 failure,. 
 Valve failure, Pump 2 failure,  
 Pump 2 failure, Pump 1 failure, 
 Pump 2 failure, Valve failure,  
 Pump 1 failure, valve failure Pump 2 failure. 
 Valve failure, pump1 failure Pump 2 failure 
 Pump 1 failure, Pump 2 failure, valve failure. 
 Valve failure, Pump 2 failure, pump1 failure  
 Pump 2 failure, Pump 1 failure, valve failure. 
 Pump 2 failure, Valve failure, pump1 failure  
The cumulative distribution functions of the overflow and dry-out are obtained 
through SIMPRA. They are shown in Figure 8.2.3. The result agrees with the result 








Figure 7.2.3 Probability estimate from SIMPRA 
 
7.2.4 Scenario Analysis 
The simulation estimate of overflow probability is higher than the result reported 
in (Aldemir, 1987). So in this section, we analyze solution provide in (Aldemir, 1987) 
and the simulation result in details.  
The equations 7.1 and 7.2 imply that: 
i. Dry-out is equivalent to the scenarios that Pump 1 fails before valve fails. 
ii. Overflow is equivalent to the scenarios that valve fails before the Pump 1 fails.  
An unstated assumption is that whether or when Pump 2 fails does not change the 







simulation, and in fact the solutions in equations 7.1 and 7.2 are not accurate. During 
the simulation, we have seen scenarios contradictory to this assumption. Figure 7.2.5 
is a pictorial summary of some scenarios we have observed in the simulation.  
 
Figure 7.2.4 Accident Scenarios Triggered by Pump2 Failure 
If we look into the scenarios more carefully, even with the assumption that no 
failure occurs following a component failure until the system enters a new control 
region, there are several scenarios neglected by Aledmir (Aldemir, 1987).   
To summarize: 
1) If Pump2 fails first (fail-on), Pump 1 will oscillate around the set point. The 







a. Pump 1 fails before valve 
i. If Pump 1 fails on, the tank will overflow definitely. 
ii. If Pump 1 fails off, liquid level drops, the valve oscillates 
around the set point.  
• If valve fails on, tank will dry-out, and  
• If valve fails off, tank will overflow.  
b. Valve fails before Pump1 (valve fails off), the tank will overflow 
definitely.  
2) If Pump 1 fails first (fail-off), the liquid level drops, till the valve close at the 
set point.  
a. If the valve fails off before reaching the set point, then Pump 2 
failure would lead to overflow.  
b. If valve fails on, the tank will dry-out definitely. 
c. If Pump 2 fails on, the valve oscillates around the set point. 
• If valve fails on, tank will dry-out, and  
• If valve fails off, tank will overflow. 
3) If the valve fails first (fails close), tank overflows 







the probabilities of all these scenarios.  
( ) 31.0=∞dryoutF  
( ) 69.0=∞overflowF  
This analytical solution is very close the result reported in (Cojazzi, 1996) and 
simulation result obtained by SIMPRA in 7.2.3.  
7.3 Case II 
7.3.1 Problem Statement 
In previous cases, all the failures are considered to be randomly distributed in 
time. In the present case, we consider failures on demand also. Possible unit states are 
nominal on, off, failing to switch (either turn on or off), runtime failure, accidentally 
turned on. Table 6-3 provide the list of stochastic failure models.  
Table 6-4 Parameters Used in Case II 
 Fail-off (Weibull) Fail-on (exponential) Fail to Switch 
Pump1 α=500, β=2 λ = 0.001 P = 0.001 
Pump2 α=500, β=2 λ = 0.001 P = 0.001 








7.3.2 Scenario Analysis 
This case was studied by Siu (Siu, 1994). An ESD is given in (Siu, 1994) 
 







The plan for SIMPRA is generated based on the ESD developed in (Siu, 1994). 
The simulation generates many scenarios outside the ESDs by Siu. One scenario 
which happens frequently outside the plan is depicted in the following figure.  
 
Figure 7.3.2 Scenarios of Case II 
One of failure scenario (left) goes like this: 
1. Pump 1 failed at 7 sec, the valve is still open. (shown by the 
downhill slope) 
2. When the liquid level reaches 3 meters, which is the open/close 
set point of the valve, and the valve successfully closes. The liquid level 
becomes stable. 
3. Pump 2 is accidentally turned on at 28 sec, the system becomes 
unstable, Pump 2 is frequently turned on and off, and valve is frequently 
opened and closed. 







5. Tank dries-out.  
This scenario is very similar to the one described by Siu as ESD 1-10-11-17. The 
ESDs developed by Siu did mention the possibility of system becoming unstable. The 
unstable system almost would definitely lead to component failure, because of the 
frequent turn on/off operation. If this is ignored the resulting system reliability 
estimate would be too optimistic. The real system design would surely avoid such 
unstable situation; one easy way is to use relay control. These event sequences 
resulted from our simulation show that the accidents scenarios we are studying are 
more complex than those analyzed in  (Siu, 1994), and system behavior is 
significantly influenced by the control design. 
Similar failure scenario is also described in Figure 7.3.2 (right).  
The detailed accident event sequence goes like this: 
1. Pump 2 is accidentally turned on at 18.5 sec. (shown by the uphill 
slope) 
2. When the liquid level reach 6, which is the higher turn off set point of 
Pump1, the system becomes unstable. Pump 1 is frequently turned on and off. 
3. Pump 1 failed to be turned off at 43.7 sec.  
4. Tank overflows.  







enhanced considerably. In Figure 8.3.4 the control relay is 0.5m. The valve /pump 
switch on/off about every 10 minutes, instead of switching on/off constantly.  
 
Figure 7.3.3 Accident Scenario Under Different Control Laws 
These scenarios have not been discussed in (Siu, 1994). If we take a closer look at 
the ESDs developed by Siu, the repetitive turning on/off of the valve or pump2 is not 
expressed explicitly. A quasi-stable state is implicitly assumed. One explanation may 
be that any real control systems would consider the stability all the time, and are more 
sophisticated than the one we discussed here. Thus, the quasi-stable assumption is 
legitimate. Even so, we have to admit the important role played by the control laws. 
Apart from the reliability of the components, a good control law would improve the 
system safety/availability considerably. The control systems always involve complex 
feedback in the system and sophisticated algorithm, which is hard to be analyze 







framework. We can determine the effect of different control laws on the system safety 
and availability, as we have seen in the example.  
7.3.3 Simulation with SIMPRA 
The ESDs of (Siu 1994) were modified to account for the repetitive events such as 
turn on/off the pumps or valve. With modified plans, 500 histories were simulated by 
SIMPRA. Figure 7.3.4 shows how the generated event sequences are distributed 
among the plans. As we can see the amount of event sequences generated distribute 
relative fairly among the plans. The true probabilities of some of the plans are 
extremely low. For example, the theoretical probability of scenario 5 is below 5e-4. 
Because there are several competing failure modes, and these scenarios require that 
the pumps and the valve to work properly for some cycles, before generating a failure, 
simply increasing the likelihood of single component failure, (i.e., traditional 
probability biasing) may miss this scenario.  
The plan only includes the scenarios triggered by pump1 failure (Table 7-5). 
Sometimes the risk analysts may want to analyze some specific accident scenarios, 
and are not interested in the probabilistic estimate very much. They may list only the 
scenarios they want to simulate in the plan. In this example, out of 500 event 
sequences, about 466 event sequences are generated in the plan. About 7% of event 









Figure 7.3.4 Allocation of Event Sequences Among Plans 
 





























































7.4 Comparison between SIMPRA results and other approaches: 
The holdup tank is a relatively simple example. In Case 1 and 2, there are only a few 
dynamic elements. The analysis compares the numerical results obtained from 
SIMPRA with the analytical results and other dynamic reliability methods. The result 
from SIMPRA and other methods compare satisfactorily.  
In Case 3, the model is more realistic and the accident scenarios are much more 
complex. A similar model has been studied by Siu. We start our simulation with a 
plan generated from his ESDs. Our simulation results show that the ESDs are 
simplified, and the real event sequences are more complex.  
ESDs rely on the risk analysts to develop the accident scenario. This is true for 
ET/FT- based methods. ET/FT is a Boolean logic representation of the system. The 







determination of the interactions between different parts, identification of the 
consequence of a random event, and determination of the severity of the 
consequences associated with scenarios. Behind every logic model, there is another 
body of modeling efforts.  
In the simulation environment the underlying modeling effort is more explicit. 
The accident scenarios are developed through simulation. In other word, the system 
expresses itself through simulation.  
In DYLAM, the system is updates at fixed time step. This limits the capability of 
the DYLAM. It is very usual to find out that the system develops fairly slowly in one 
stage but changing rapidly in another stage. We can see this in the holdup tank 
example. In nominal conditions, the system is steady, but if some component fails, 
the system evolution is very fast. In such cases using one fixed time step in the whole 
procedure is not an appropriate choice. In SIMPRA, we have a discrete model 









8. Application II - Satellite Telecommunication Example 
8.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, a telecommunication system is analyzed in with SIMPRA. The 
system is still under design. An abstract model is built to simulate the behavior the 
system. In this example, a model that is only using logical and temporal relations in 
its input functions is presented. This example is about a space craft that receives 
commands from a ground station to collect data while orbiting a planet and sends the 
data back for analysis. A comprehensive model of the ground station and the 
spacecraft is built with the SIMPRA software. 
In general, eight states are determined for the spacecraft: one initial state, five 
transitional states and two failure states. It is assumed that space craft spends a fixed 
amount of time in each state before moving to the next state except for  
1) The standby state: The duration of time in that state is related to the commands 
received from the ground station and  
2) The "Failed" state. This is an absorbing state, and the system will remain in this 








Figure 8.1.1 State Transition Graph 
In this example, the transition input function includes a temporal function which 
indicates the duration of stay in the first state and a logic that describes the actions 
that need to be taken before transitions become activated. The Planner and the 
Scheduler work at different levels of abstraction. In the Planner, the process is to send 
data to the ground station, if all the components involved in the process are working, 
then the process is going to be successful. This assumption is just for planner. The 
detailed simulation will simulate the data generated from camera and simulate the 
downlink data and analyze the quality of the data sent to the ground station and then 
decide if the process was successful, failure, or degraded. 







functionalities. The table, for example, shows that “DownLink Data” has the 
following relations:  
• High Level:  Computer AND Telecomm AND SpaceCraftBus AND RCS 
AND Software 
• Low Level: Clock AND Processor AND Transmitter AND Antenna AND 
HKSensors AND Pointing AND Software 
Table 8-1 Component Functionality Matrix 
Components Downlink Data Collect Data Process Data Uplink Data
Camera  ×   
Computer × × × × 
Clock × ×  × 
Memory  × ×  AND 
Processor × × × × 
Telecomm × × × × 
Transmitter ×    
Receiver    × AND 
Antenna ×   × 
SpaceCraftBus × × × × 
 HKSensors × × × × 
RCS × ×  × 
 Pointing × ×  × 









Table 8-2 Plan For Telecom System 
Plan 1 STANDBY|RECEIVE_COMMAND|ANTENNA_F!L|END_0!L 
Plan 2 STANDBY|RECEIVE_COMMAND|HOUSEKEEPING_F!L|END_0!L 
Plan 3 STANDBY|RECEIVE_COMMAND|ANTENNA_D|END_0 
Plan 4 STANDBY|RECEIVE_COMMAND|HOUSEKEEPING_D|END_0 
Plan 5 STANDBY|RECEIVE_COMMAND|COLLECT_DATA|CAMERA_F|END_0 
Plan 6 STANDBY|RECEIVE_COMMAND|COLLECT_DATA|CAMERA_D|END_0 
Plan 7 STANDBY|RECEIVE_COMMAND|COLLECT_DATA|HOUSEKEEPING_F|END_0 
Plan 8 STANDBY|RECEIVE_COMMAND|COLLECT_DATA|HOUSEKEEPING_D|END_0 
Plan 9 STANDBY|RECEIVE_COMMAND|COLLECT_DATA|PROCESS_DATA|HOUSEKEEPING_F|END_0 
Plan 10 STANDBY|RECEIVE_COMMAND|COLLECT_DATA|PROCESS_DATA|HOUSEKEEPING_D|END_0 
Plan 11 STANDBY|RECEIVE_COMMAND|COLLECT_DATA|PROCESS_DATA|DOWNLINK_DATA|ANTENNA_F|END_0 
Plan 12 STANDBY|RECEIVE_COMMAND|COLLECT_DATA|PROCESS_DATA|DOWNLINK_DATA|HOUSEKEEPING_F|END_0 
Plan 13 STANDBY|RECEIVE_COMMAND|COLLECT_DATA|PROCESS_DATA|DOWNLINK_DATA|ANTENNA_D|END_0 







The modeling process for the components is simple. The assumption is that all of 
the components have only two states: “Work” and “Fail” (without any repair). Logic 
of the functional relations between the components and subsystems are provided by 
the users so when it comes to low level modeling, those relations are already 
provided. A library of subsystems and components as well as a library of 
functionalities with importance measures can be kept as a knowledge base for 
planning and simulation of different systems.  To generate a list of scenarios that 
might cause the system to fail, a model of the system should be generated.  Then by 
using the library of functionalities, transitions between the states of the system can be 
defined and a plan for failing the system can automatically be generated. Table 8-2 
lists the plan that is used to run the simulation. Based on the knowledge, the Planer 
generates plans to take system from one state to another.  
 
8.2 Scheduler/Simulator side 
The satellite telecommunication example simulates the satellite communicating 
with the ground station. The software model for the system includes the software on 
spacecraft and software on ground.  The software on the spacecraft is responsible for 
receiving command, collecting data, processing data, downlink data. The software on 







receiving data from the spacecraft. 
Different failure scenarios have been planed by the Planner. The failure may 
involve a software or hardware malfunction. If the ground station detects that the data 
transmitted from spacecraft is erroneous, a command would be issued that require the 
spacecraft to switch to safe mode. By switching to safe mode, it is possible that the 
spacecraft could recover. If the spacecraft fails to recover, thus no data are 
transmitted to ground station, and this is considered to be a system failure. If the 
spacecraft successfully recover, some data would still be transmitted to ground 
station, even though maybe not as much as previously required, and this is considered 
a degraded system.   
 
 








8.3 Result Analysis  
8.3.1 End State Probability Estimation 
There are three different end states: Failed, Degraded and Success. We run the 
simulation to generate 500 event sequences, and the estimation converges after about 
400 event sequences. In this application, the system of interest is still under design. 
The simulation model is very abstract. This application shows the capability of 
SIMPRA to perform risk analysis at the design stage of the system. The risk analysts 
may gain some insights of the failure scenarios. It is helpful for them to design 
safety/reliability requirements and make improvements to the system safety and 
reliability before it is too late. It is predictable that as the design refines, and detailed 
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8.3.2 Allocation of samples over the planed scenarios 
In the plan (see table. 8-2), there are 14 different scenarios. The figure shows the 
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Figure 8.3.2  An example of the allocation of event sequences among plan. 
It is clear that the simulation efforts were evenly distributed within the 14 
scenarios.  There are 413 event sequences out of 500 in the plan. There are 87 event 








9. Application II - Space Shuttle Ascent Phase 
This section describes the application of SIMPRA DPRA platform to a simplified 
model of the Space Shuttle mission in its ascent phase. In the application, we show 
the basic modeling procedure and some of the capability of SIMPRA. A simulation 
model of Space Shuttle was implemented, with simplified flight dynamics as well as 
hardware, software and crew functions and failure events.  
9.1 Summary of the Shuttle Ascent Phase: 
In the Space Shuttle missions, the thrust required to reach orbit is provided by the 
three Space Shuttle main Engines (SSMEs) and the two Solid Rocket Boosters 
(SRBs). About 2 minutes after ignition, the two SRBs are separated from the External 
Tank. The SSMEs continue working for about 8 minutes. They shut down just before 
the orbiter is inserted into orbit. The external tank is then separated from the orbiter. 
(NASA, 2000) 
During launch and ascent, the guidance, navigation and control (GN&C) software 








If there is a failure that affects vehicle performance, abort may become necessary. 
The objective of Space Shuttle launch abort is to safely recover the flight crew, the 
orbiter and its payload. 
 
 
Figure 9.1.1 Figure Space Shuttle Intact Abort. 
There are four intact abort modes  







temporary orbit that is lower than the nominal orbit. 
- Abort Once Around: The AOA is designed to allow the vehicle to fly once 
around the Earth and make a normal entry and landing.   
- Transatlantic Landing: The TAL mode is designed to permit an intact landing 
on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean.   
- Return to Launch Site: The RTLS mode involves flying downrange to 
dissipate propellant and then turning around under power to return directly to a 
landing at or near the launch site.  
The types of events that lead to initiation of a mission abort can be classified as 
failures of critical shuttle systems, such as life support system, that make the 
successful completion of nominal mission impossible, and the shutdown or 
degradation of engines, leading to a loss of thrust. 
An abort mode is selected depending on the cause and timing of the failure which 
causes the abort. The safest one is preferable. In cases where performance loss is the 
only factor, the preferred modes would be ATO, AOA, TAL and RTLS, in that order. 
The mode chosen is the highest one as long as it can be completed with the remaining 
vehicle performance. In the case of some support system failures, the preferred mode 
might be the one that will end the mission most quickly. In these cases, TAL or RTLS 







A simplified model of the shuttle ascent procedure was used in our simulation. In 
our model, a 6-degree-of-freedom dynamic model is used to calculate the simplified 
flight dynamics, such as altitude, velocity. More details can be found later in this 
chapter.  
The model incorporates several failure modes: 
- SSME benign shutdown. The SSME may shutdown prematurely, but no major 
damage to other components of the Shuttle. The thrust provided by remaining 
engines may be inadequate for the shuttle to reach the desired orbit. This may 
make the abort procedure necessary.  
- SSME catastrophic failure. The engine fails and cause damage to other 
component. This will lead to LOC/ LOV. The abort procedure is not an option 
in this failure mode. 
- Software failure, which will cause loss of thrust. This may also require the 
crew to abort.  
- Other failures, such as life support system failure. Life support system failure 








9.2 Building Then Simulation Model 
The simulation model was implemented using the library block provided by 
SIMPRA.  The highest layer of the model is shown in figure 9.2.1. 
 
Figure 9.2.1 Space Shuttle Example Simulation Model  
Hardware Module will simulate the hardware performance. Thrust and other 
dynamics data are input to the Motion Block, where the system trajectory is 
calculated. Human and Software Modules will control the system behavior, such as 








Figure 9.2.2 Hardware Simulation Module. 
Hardware  Module covers main engines, solid rocket boosters, life support 
system, etc. The inputs are control commands, Shuttle state and time. The module 
calculates the thrust, fuel consumption, Shuttle mass and other hardware behavior. 
Three SSMEs and two SRBs provide the thrust. Life Support System is responsible 
for maintaining the Shuttle cabin environment. The hardware is controlled by the 








Figure 9.2.3 SSME module 
The SSME and SRB modules calculate the thrust they provides controlled by 
software. The load of the engine may vary from 60% to 110%. The SRB and ET will 
be separated when the fuel is consumed. SRB and SSME modules also calculate the 
mass, which is needed to calculate flight dynamics. 
The hardware dynamics is fed into the Shuttle Motion Block. Other input data of 
the Motion Block include environment data, such as gravity. A 6-degree-freedom 
model is used to calculate the shuttle dynamics.  
The nominal trajectory is showed in Figure 9.2.4. This graph is also part of the 








Figure 9.2.4 Height vs. Time for Space Shuttle 
Failures of the components are modeled using the library block of the SIMPRA. 
The occurrence and timing of failures are controlled by the Scheduler.  
The failure behavior module is embedded in the component models, which will 
generate branching points. The Weibull Failure Rate block calculates the failure 
rate ( )tλ , as a function of time and system state. This is a built-in library of SIMPRA, 
and used can click and drag the block to the model, and specify the parameters. The 
“Time Distributed Event” is another built-in SIMPRA library block. It generates the 








Figure 9.2.5 Runtime Failure Subsystem (inside each component module) 
In the simulation model, different failure modes of SSME are considered: the 
main engine may either experience a benign shutdown or a catastrophic failure. By 
“catastrophic failure” we mean that if the main engines fail this way, the Shuttle and 
the crew will be lost. The benign shutdown may be triggered by different component 
failures or degradation.  
Common cause failures are also considered. One example of CCFs is that a sub-
component shared by different components. Figure 9.2.6 is the fault tree of this 
example. We can see the component SSME_CCF is shared by all three SSMEs. This 
type CCF sometimes is referred to as “shared equipment dependency” (Mosleh, 
Rasmuson, & Marshall, 1998).  







components. For example one of the components of SSME, the failure rate depends 
on the temperature, f(t) = g(temp, t). The identical components can be found in all 
three SSMEs, and the temperature is almost the same. This type CCF sometimes is 
referred to as “extrinsic environment dependency” (Mosleh et al., 1998). 
Such CCF is not easy to model in the traditional fault tree analysis. In the 
SIMPRA modeling environment all these are easy to be taken account of.  
 








9.2.1 Software Model 
Software model reads the flight dynamics and hardware state, and controls the 
Shuttle ascent procedure, such as ignition, thrust of SRBs/ SSMEs, and ET/SRB 
separation. The software is modeled by finite state machine, and implemented by 
Stateflow®. The software may fail randomly. The stochastic model represents the 
uncertain behavior of the software. The stochastic failure behavior is controlled by 
the simulation Scheduler during simulation based on predefined rules  
 
Figure 9.2.7 Stateflow® model of Shuttle GNC Software 
The nominal operation of the software has several states: Mode 101, Mode 102, 
Mode 103 and Mode 601, which represent different phases of the mission. During the 







advanced to next phase. At different phase of the mission the GNC software performs 
different functions. For example, during first-stage ascent, the software operates in 
major mode 102. The GNC software controls the SRBs and SSMEs. At the end of the 
first stage, the SRBs are separated from the space shuttle orbiter, and software 
automatically shifts to major mode 103. In the major mode 103 (second stage), 
software calculates the required main engine steering commands to achieve preflight-
defined MECO conditions. During the mission, the software would switch from one 
mode to another when the mission advanced to next phase. Different software modes 
perform different functions. The software may fail to switch to new mode. Also the 
software may fail during the mission. Failure here means that the output of the GNC 
software is wrong, which is critical to the shuttle safety.  
There are indications (alarms) to the crew when such failure happens. In such 
situation, the crew would have to abort the mission, and initiate the abort procedure. 
These aspects involved interaction between the software Module and Crew Behavior 
Module of the simulation model. 
9.2.2 Crew Behavior Model 
If the hardware malfunctions, such as engine premature shutdown, the crew will 
check the Shuttle state and decide whether to abort. There are indicators and alarms to 







the unusual condition of the shuttle, even without indicators or alarms. If the crew 
decides to abort the mission, they should choose the correct abort mode according the 
rules shown in Table 8-1, and initiate the corresponding abort procedure. It is 
assumed that human crew may make wrong decision. Also considered is that the 
probability of a successful abort depends on the time when the abort is performed and 
the type of abort.  
An IDAC-based crew behavior model (Mosleh & Chang, 2004) is developed to 
simulate the human crew action. The main idea behind the cognitive behavior model 
is to use PIFs to estimate the probability that a specific behavior is going to take place 
in a given situation.  The cognitive model uses a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) to 
model the cause-effect relationship among the PIFs and how the PIFs influence 
information processing behavior and decision making during an event. 
Crew knowledge and experiences are stored in the IDAC model of human 
knowledge base (long term memory). An operator's long term memory may contain 
the functional and physical characteristics of the system and its underlying processes; 
general guidelines on how to respond to accidents, knowledge of available options 
and memorized procedures; and expected response of system to perturbations, learned 
through training and operating experience (Mosleh & Chang, 2004). In preset 








The number and quality of information accumulated in the long-term memory 
reflects the level of experience of an individual, and have a great impact on how an 
individual will deal with threaten encountered. 
Table 9-1   Mission Abort Procedures Rules 
 LSS Failure SSME Failure Software Failure 
MET = 0 seconds 
(shuttle on ground) 
Abort on ground Abort on ground Abort on ground 
MET < 150 seconds RTLS RTLS RTLS 
150 < MET < 220 s RTLS TAL TAL 
220 < MET < 400 s TAL TAL TAL 
MET > 400 seconds ATO ATO ATO 
In the simulation, all indicators of flight dynamics and alarms for component 
failures are fed into the crew model. Another type of system feedback modeled in the 
crew model is abnormal vibrations caused by engine failure. This is a signal 
independent of the indicator and alarms. In real system, much more information 
would be displayed in the cockpit, and the mental burden of the astronauts would be 
greater than what is simulated here. In the simulation, it is assumed that the crew may 
neglect the alarms, and fail to detect the need to abort in time, or when they decide to 







Human error is a contributor to many accidents, especially when we take account 
of the fact that the shuttle crew works in a very disturbing and stressful environment. 
The objective of the human model is to simulate the human behavior under such 
conditions.  
When there is a need to initiate abort procedure, the crew has to decide which 
abort mode to initiate. The astronaut would search the knowledge base to find the 
right abort mode. Because the astronaut is highly stressed, and the timing is important, 
the astronaut may apply a limited search strategy. This means that the astronaut 
would search only part of the knowledge base. The time for finding the answer is 
shorter, but the likelihood of get a wrong answer is higher. Note that limited search 
strategy does not necessarily produce a wrong answer and the reaction time when 
applying this strategy is generally shorter.  
9.3 Analysis Results: 
9.3.1 Exploration Methods 
Different exploration methods are applied to the Space Shuttle model. End state 
probabilities were estimated using different methods: 
• Planned Exploration: 







The plan used for the planned exploration is generated by the SIMPRA planner 
with the analysis of the state transition diagram of the Shuttle launch procedure. 
Hardware failure, software malfunctions and human behavior are all considered in the 
plan. The difference in timing of same type of failures may lead to different end state, 
thus they may belong to different scenarios in the plan.  
Table 9-2 Plan for Shuttle Model 
Plan 1 Catostrophic|End_0 
Plan 2 time(400;500)SSME|ABORT|End_0 
Plan 3 time(220;400)SSME|ABORT|End_0 
Plan 4 time(150;220)SSME|ABORT|End_1 
Plan 5 time(6;150)SSME|ABORT|End_0 
Plan 6 time(400;500)LSS|ABORT|End_0 
Plan 7 time(220;400)LSS|ABORT|End_0 
Plan 8 time(150;220)LSS|ABORT|End_0 
Plan 9 time(6;150)LSS|ABORT|End_0 
Plan 10 TIME(0;6);SW101_2|END_0 
Plan 11 TIME(0;6);SSME|ABORT|END_0 
Plan 12 TIME(0;6);LSS|ABORT|END_0 
Plan 13 TIME(6;120);SW102|ABORT|END_0 
Plan 14 Negate; ALL 
The plan in table 9-2 is a high level abstract plan. For example SSME represent 
the SSME benign shut down. The shuttle has three identical SSMEs, each of which is 







components and failure modes. A fault tree analysis can interpret the “SSME shut 
down” as a cut-set, or a combination of stochastic failure events. This piece of 
information is stored in a database file. When scheduler loads the plan, the scheduler 
would query the database file and generate the detailed plan to guide the simulation.  
With the unplanned exploration strategy, the failure rates of components are 
accelerated to achieve better estimation. The idea is very similar to the strategy used 
by many practitioners of Monte Carlo simulation in PRA.  
9.3.2 Event Sequences 
The simulation generates a large number of event sequences. If no failures occur 
during the mission time, the mission is achieved, and the end state is Success. We are 
more interested in looking at the failure scenarios to find out what lead to accidents. 
Table 9.2 records one event sequence generated by the simulation. 
Table 9.2 A Recorded Event Sequence 
 
The first line is the actual event sequence. We see consecutively two sub-
components of SSME3 fail, which lead to the main engine failure. This results in a 
{ SSME3_1@93 , SSME3_3@146 , RTLS@149.1 , E-3@150 ,  } 








benign engine shutdown. The engine fails at 146 seconds, and the crew initiates abort 
procedure at 149.1 second.  
The second line shows the end state, statistical weight of this sequence and the 
end state time. ES_3 indicates that the end state is a successful abort. We find the 
statistical weight is pretty low, which implies that this is a rare scenario.  
The third line indicates that the crew response is correct.  
Table 9-3 Another Recorded Event Sequence 
 
Another example of recorded event sequences is given in table 9-2. The first line is 
the actual event sequence. We see consecutively two sub-components of main engine 
SSME2 and SSME3 fail. This does not lead to the main engine failure due to the 
redundancy. The Life Support fails at 120 seconds, and the crew initiates abort 
procedure at 124.3 second. We may notice that the crew has initiated the wrong abort 
procedure, which is recoded in the third line. The wrong abort procedure leads to the 
loss of vehicle and crew (LOVC) end state. This is recoded as ES_1 in the second 
line. Again, the statistical weight is pretty low, which implies that this is a rare 
{ SSME3_1@63 , SSME2_3@96 , LSS@120, ATO@124.3 , E-1@125 ,  } 









9.3.3 End State Probabilities Estimation 
The simulation results of the three different exploration methods are summarized in 
Table 8-4. The theoretical result is obtained through a Monte Carlo simulation with 
10,000 histories.  
Table 9-4 End State Probability Estimation 
 
Theoretical Planned 500 samples 
Not Planned 
500 samples 
LOVC 6.12E-3 6.3E-3 5.40E-3 
Abort 6.55E-3 6.46E-3 7.1E-3 
Success 0.987 0.987 0.988 
The Planned exploration gets the estimation with a low relative error. But the 
estimation generated by “not planned exploration” was rather poor. 
Figure 9.3.1 shows the convergence of the estimate of probability of LOVC. It shows 









Figure 9.3.1 Estimation of the Probability of LOVC 
9.3.4 Allocation of Event Sequences 
The role of the plan is to specify the scenarios of interest, as a guide to the scheduler. 
The scheduler will favor the scenarios listed in the plan. If there is no plan, the 
scheduler will distribute the simulation effort randomly.  
Table 8.5 listed different scenarios which are of interest to the system analyst. 
These scenarios are rare due to the high reliability of the system. The scheduler 
guides the simulation to explore these scenarios with high efficiency. Not much effort 
is wasted in repeating event sequences where there is no component failures and 
























































Figure 9.3.2 Allocation of Event Sequences 
The scheduler constantly guides the simulation towards scenarios in the plan. The 
expected information gain is calculated at the end of the event sequence. In this 
example all the scenarios have the same “importance level”, so the most important 
contributor to the value of each branch is the expected information gain. The 
Scheduler maintains the balance among scenarios by favoring branches with higher 
values. The expected information gain does not only depends on the number 
sequences already generated, but also depends on how consistently the end states 
have been reached. For example, the catastrophic failure of SSME would always lead 
to end state LOVC. The outcome of this event is certain. The expected information 







this scenario. The scheduler does avoid the scenario (plan 1), as we can tell from 
figure 9.3.2. “Plan 1” is the scenario least simulated.  
If there is no plan, the scheduler decides on the exploration randomly. Many of 
the event sequences ended in the scenarios outside the plan. Some of the scenarios 
were left untouched.  
The result shows that the scheduler with the plan successfully guides the 
simulation and distributes the simulation effort fairly.  
9.4 Conclusion 
Even though the simulation model is only hypothetical and simplified, the 
interactions between the different parts in the system are fairly complex. For example, 
the human action depends on the PIFs and the information they receive. The PIFs 
would be influenced by the history, current system status and environment. The 
information the crew receive may be affected by the hardware and/or software failure. 
The system is very sensitive to the timing and order of the random events. These 
dynamic features cannot easily captured by traditional ET/FT methods.  With this 
model we show the capacity of SIMPRA to model hardware, software and human. 
SIMPRA provides a platform to integrate different parts of the system in a single 
simulation model.  







limited computing cost. This is the major difficulty faced by Monte Carlo simulation. 
The SIMPRA has an efficient algorithm to guide the simulation towards the scenarios 
generate more information, and avoid spending much computing power on the event 








10. Summary and Future Research 
10.1 Summary of Research Results 
10.1.1 Overview 
In this dissertation, we introduced a new Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
methodology. A general purpose DPRA platform implementing the methodology is 
developed at University of Maryland.  
In this dissertation, we interpret the DPRA problem as an exploration of the event 
sequences space. The DDET and Monte Carlo simulation methods represent two 
different exploration strategies: systematic and random exploration. Instead of 
focusing on obtaining a numerical result, we approach the problem of exploring the 
unknown space efficiently. Some of the terminology used throughout the dissertation 
is explained in this chapter. These terms may be loosely defined and used in DPRA 
literatures. We have clearly defined the terminology and it has been used in 
consistence with the definitions, throughout this dissertation. We have particularly 
stressed the difference between the terms scenarios and event sequences.  







this framework, the knowledge of the system is explicitly used to guide the simulation 
to achieve higher efficiency. A planner is responsible for generating plans as a high 
level map to guide simulation. A scheduler is responsible for guiding the simulation 
toward the scenarios, which may generate more information about the system. In 
scheduler a tree structure is used to represent the scenarios we are interested in. 
During the simulation, the scheduler checks the status of the simulation and guides 
the simulation toward the scenarios of interest. The scheduler is also required to 
maintain a balance between the different scenarios. When the scheduler decides the 
path in which to guide the simulation, it compares the values of all possible options. 
The scheduler always favors the branches with higher values; however, it is a random 
process, and the one with the highest value is most likely to be picked, but not 
always. The guided simulation will generate a lot of event sequences and our 
knowledge of the system is updated. A new round of simulation may be required with 
the updated plan.  
. The SIM-PRA is a generic-purpose risk assessment software package which 
implements the guided simulation methodology. It provides a rich library of DPRA 
elements, with the help of which the users can easily design their own DPRA 
simulation models. Some ideas of an object-oriented paradigm are used in the 
implementation. The users only need to specify the failure characteristics of the 








We apply our methodology to solve the DPRA problems of three different 
models. The first one is the holdup tank problem, which has been discussed 
frequently in the DPRA literatures. It is a relatively simple one. We solve the problem 
using the assumptions made by other researchers, and compare our results with theirs. 
We also provide a numerical and asymptotic solution. Our results agree with both the 
numerical solution and the works of other researchers. After lifting some of the 
assumptions we have made in this case, the situation becomes more complex. The 
accident scenarios have been discussed in other literatures. Our simulation 
demonstrates that the accident scenarios are highly dependent on the system 
dynamics; the event sequences need to be analyzed with great care.  
SIMPRA is applied to a satellite telecommunication system which is still under 
design. An abstract model is built with SIMPRA. After analyzing the state transition 
graph and the component functionality relations, a plan for the simulation is 
generated. A number of accident event sequences were simulated, and an estimate of 
the end state probabilities is achieved.  
Another example is a hypothetical model of a space shuttle ascent phase. In the 
model, we observe complex system interactions, between human, software, and 
hardware. Apart from the hardware model, we built a human behavior model and a 







important roles in the evolution of the system. The system is tightly coupled. The 
SIM-PRA very efficiently produces a model to depict the system and generate the 
risk analysis. With these two examples, we have shown the capability of our 
methodology and its difference from previous works. 
10.1.2 Comparison with Others’ Work 
Inspired by the analogy to human reasoning and learning, we propose a new 
framework for dynamic PRA. In this new framework prior knowledge is actively 
used and the simulation is guided adaptively by the Scheduler. The traditional PRA 
methods, such as state transition diagram, and fault tree analysis, are still actively 
applied in the new framework. Such methods are not used to develop and solve the 
numerical or mathematical model directly, but to generate a plan which would be 
high level map to guide the simulation. The simulation is carefully guided by the 
scheduler to maximize the information gain from the simulation. The simulation is 
guided toward scenarios which has higher potential to provide insight into the system 
vulnerabilities.  
The hybrid type of DDET and Monte Carlo is desired by many authors (Labeau et 
al., 2000). This research is one of the attempts. The new exploration strategy used in 
our approach is not purely random as in Monte Carlo simulation. Nor is it predefined 







into account to design the simulation rules. The systematic exploration strategy is also 
supported in our framework. We can perform a DDET analysis just as the one 
performed by ADS. Also we can perform a “partial" DDET analysis, where only the 
designated events are explored systematically, while the remaining parts are explored 
with the new exploration strategy we have proposed.  
We have shown the capability of this methodology with the applications. When 
dealing complex dynamical system, it detects system vulnerabilities and estimates the 
probabilities of end states with high efficiency and accuracy. 
10.2 Future Research 
The new framework proposed in this dissertation still leaves many areas open for 
future researches.  
10.2.1 Planner 
Planner is the software to gather the prior information before the simulation and 
generate the plan to guide the simulation. It also updates the plans using the simulated 
results. In the current Planner the prior information mainly comes from an abstract 
model of the system under study. SIMPRA is able to construct such models and 
generate the plans from the models.  







information, e.g., experience with the similar systems, general risk knowledge. The 
qualitative reasoning is another powerful tool to refine the plan. How to integrate all 
these information together constitutes a major challenge.  
10.2.2 Multi-level Modeling 
By definition, the simulation model is an abstraction of the real-life system. The 
abstraction level is somewhat arbitrary. We want to want model to be as simple as 
possible, but at the same time we do not want to miss any important details of the 
system. We even can say that the model which best represent the system, is the 
system itself. There is always trade-off between the details/precision and 
computational cost.  
For risk analysis purpose, we have to investigate the system behavior under 
different circumstances. We believe that the most detailed model is not required 
under all circumstances. There are circumstances under which the system evolution is 
more stable, and a simplified model would be sufficient for the analysis purpose. If 
we were able to develop an algorithm to determine which level of abstraction would 
suffice the need, and adjust the simulation accordingly, we could predict a 
considerable reduction in computation time without significant loss of precision.  
The key issue is to identify the area where the risk-critical evolution is sensitive to 







have the simulation model built in different levels, and we know the error range of 
each level. Thus we can find the appropriate level to satisfy our simulation 
requirement. This procedure should be done adaptively and automatically by the 
Scheduler. The past simulations could provide important information on whether the 
precession requirements are met, and thus whether to switch to a more detailed or 
more simplified level under the same or similar circumstances.  
The idea has been applied a small system. Application to larger scale systems is 
still under development.  
10.2.3 Human Modeling and Software Modeling 
Human modeling and software modeling play a very important role in the system 
risk analysis. The modeling of hardware is better understood compared to the one of 
human and software. In highly coupled human-software-hardware systems the human 
and software must be integrated into the PRA work.  
The modeling of human or software behavior is still an open problem for future 
research. The human model and software model used in SIMPRA applications 
represent the state-of-art techniques. With the improvements in human and software 
modeling, the integrated DPRA methodology introduced here would become even 










Appendix A. Graphical Representation in DPRA 
Graphs provide an intuitive representation of the system logic. To perform 
probabilistic risk analysis, one widely accepted way is to represent the system by 
Fault tree analysis, and to represent the scenarios by Event Trees. In recent years, 
efforts are made to grasp the dynamic characteristics and/or dynamic scenarios, which 
are not explicitly expressed in classical FT/ET framework. 
1. DFT 
Due to the wide acceptance of the FTA, it is natural to extend the Fault Tree 
Analysis to capture the dynamic characteristics of the systems.  
Dugan et al introduced several dynamic Fault-Tree gates (Dugan1992). Static 
fault tree is poor to deal with sequence dependency, fault and error recovery, use of 
spare.  
Four new gates are introduced, Functional dependency gate, Cold spare gate, 








Figure A.1 Special Gates of Dynamic Fault Tree 
The dynamic fault tree can be automatically converted into a Markov model. 
When the dimension of system grows, this conversion may generate a huge state 
space. Efforts have been devoted to automatically separate the Fault-Tree into sub-
trees, which may be either static or dynamic, and the sub-trees would be solved using 
different algorithms. Combinational methods, such as BDD would be used if the sub-
tree is static, and Markov-chain models would be used to solve the dynamic sub-tree. 
Software packages, such as DITree and later Galileo are developed at the University 
of Virginia to solve the Dynamic Fault tree model. (Dugan, Sullivan, & Coppit, 2000) 
The model is automatically decomposed into independent sub-trees (Dugan, 2000). 
To avoid the complexity of Markov model, several different approaches have been 








This type of DFT is widely used to solve phased-mission problems. The phased-
mission problem, which is characterized by the fact that the system structure, failure 
and recovery processes, or success criteria can change with each phase, has been 
investigate for more than two decades. Dugan proposed a unified framework to define 
the separate phases using fault trees. (Dugan, 1991)The system is evaluated by 
constructing and solving the resulting Markov model. The models for each phase are 
combined into one model. Later on, more efforts were devoted to solve the PMS more 
efficiently, several different algorithms were proposed: PMS-BDD, (Zang 1999) 
GPMS-CPR (Xing & Dugan, 2002)(Xing2002), Modular approach, Ou2004. Most 
methods are either combinational models or Markov-chain based models.  
Cepin et al proposed a different kind of Dynamic Fault Tree to address the time 
requirements in safety systems (Cepin & Mavko, 2002). House events, which could 
be turn on or off at discrete time points, were introduced to the classic fault tree to 
deal with the time requirements. A house event matrix represents the house events 
being switched on and off through discrete time point.  
The Dynamic Fault Trees are supported in several commercial fault tree software 
packages, such as Relex, Sapphire, and FaultTree+. Both types of DFT extend the 
functionality of the FTA to include some dynamic features, but neither of them is able 
to deal with the full spectrum of dynamic characteristics. They rely on the Markov 







between component behavior and the process parameters are not captured by the DFT 
methodology. They rely on the Markov assumption of the model.  
2. GO-Flow  
GO-FLOW was originally a success-oriented implementation of diagraph based 
modeling methodology derived from the earlier GO methodology (Matsuoka & 
Kobayashi, 1988). The GO-FLOW chart represents the system configuration and 
functions as well as the failure. A number of operators representing different failure 
modes, logic operators and signal generators are used to construct the chart. Signals, 
which represent physical variables or time or any information, propagate through the 
system of interest. The state of the system or components at any point in time is 
determined algebraically through the logic gates and other operators. The NOT logic 
gate and procedures to address common cause failures were later introduced into the 
methodology. Later improvements make GO-FLOW able to treat the logic-loop and 
maintenance activity (Matsuoka, 2004).  
The generation of GO-FLOW chart and the follow-up computation has been 
computerized. Matsuoka claimed it can be used to model phased mission more 
compactly compared with ET/FT approach. It is shown that a complex phased 
mission can be an analyzed with a single GO-FLOW model and the availability 
function was obtained in one single run.  







FLOW charts, so it is difficult to represent some types of system configuration, such 
as k-out-of-n system. Hierarchical charts are not available either, thus the problem of 
combinational explosion is significant while dealing with large systems. Some 
important information routinely provided by ET/FT, such as minimal cuts sets and 
importance measures is not easily obtained in GO-FLOW model (Siu 1994). Also, 
please note that GO-FLOW methodology can only be applied to treat constant failure 
rate or repair rate.  
3. Petri Nets 
A Petri Net is a directed graph. There are two types of nodes: places and 
transitions, and arcs that connect them. The abstract objects (tokens, drawn as bold 
face dots) move in the nodes. Each place (denoted as circles) can store a non-negative 
number of tokens. Transitions (denoted as rectangles) model activities changing the 
state of the system. Transitions are allowed when the prediction for the activities is 
fulfilled (enabled). A transition can fire and remove one or more tokens from the 
input place and deposit the tokens to the output place. For more details about Petri 
Nets, there are several textbooks or monograph available. (Bause & Kritzinger, 2002; 
Schneeweiss, 1999, 2001) 
Petri Nets are widely used in such fields as operational research, computer 
network, software modeling, and flexible manufacturing systems. There were 







dynamic reliability/maintenance models are built with Petri Nets. (Dutuit 1997) used 
the SPN to model two test cases and evaluate the safety characteristics using Monte 
Carlo techniques. Volovoi et al. introduced aging token as means to model aging 
(Volovoi, 2004), and claims that aging tokens improve the flexibility and clarity of 
dependability (reliability and availability) modeling of aging systems. Hybrid Petri 
Nets (Chatelet et al., 1998; Kermisch C., 2004) model impact of continuous process 
variables on the firing of transitions based on the theory of probabilistic dynamics  
(Labeau et al., 2000).  
The variations of the Petri Nets formalisms and the lack a of unified standard may 
lead to confusion and misunderstanding. The stochastic Petri Nets are hard to be 
verified.  
4. Event Sequence Diagram 
ESD is a graphical representation of the success or failure scenarios. It shows the 
path from an initiating event to the system end. ESDs can be used to document the 
accidents and help the engineers to understand the accidents scenarios. In nuclear 








Figure A.2 Concept of Event Sequence Diagram 
ESDs are extensively used in space industry to identify possible accident 
scenarios. ((Swaminathan & Smidts, 1999 a, 1999 b) extended the ESD framework to 
handle the temporal logic and process dynamics. The mathematical formulization to 
set up the Markov or semi-Markov state transition equations is also provided.  
QRAS® (Groen, Smidts, Mosleh, & Swaminathan, 2002) is a software package, 
which provides an interactive tool to build ESDs, but the software is primarily a 
classic (static) PRA tool.  
ESD approach relies on the accurate description of sequences, which cannot be 
performed automatically. The quality depends on the analysts. (Swaminathan & 







5. Dynamic Flow-graph Methodology 
Garrett et al. introduced DFM to model software-driven embedded systems 
(Garrett, Guarro, & Apostolakis, 1995). Later DFM has been used in nuclear, space 
and other industries to analyze control systems.  
The system models are developed in the light of the cause-effect relationships 
between physical variables and timing characteristics. The DFM model is analyzed by 
tracing backward the sequences of events through the model, i.e. deductively from 
effect to cause to determine how the systems reach certain state. The result is timed 
fault-trees, which take the form of the logic combinations of static trees relating 
system parameters at different time. DFM based hazard analysis can be used to 
identify system hazards, including the previous unknown failure modes, and thus 
guide the hazard mitigation efforts. The use of multi-value logic is advantageous 
compared to the binary nature of Fault Trees. 
Labeau pointed out that the discretization of physical variables may produce large 
multi-dimensional matrices and even discretization errors (Labeau et al., 2000). The 
DFM is not capable of representing the stochastic characteristics.  
Appendix B: Application of Dynamic Fault Tree Simulation 







AND gate as shown in Figure B.1. 
 
Figure B.1 Application of Dynamic Fault Tree 
The two components follow a Weibull failure rate where a1=400, b1=2 and 
a2=500, b2=2. The analytical solution for this system is easy to get. Given the mission 
time is 500s, we can calculate the system reliability analytically.  
( ) ( )[ ] 773.0)(500)(500
500
0
221 =−⋅= ∫ dttFFtfR  
We run the simulation for 500 event sequences. The estimated R(500)’ = 0.781. The 
relative error is 1%. The convergence of the estimator is shown figure B.2. We can 
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